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ABSTRACT

Congressionaloversight of the Executive is among the chief responsibilities
of the legislative branch. Inspectors General ("IGs") are among the most important tools available to Congress because they are "hard-wired" into the

Executive itself. The value of IGs to Congress depends on their expertise in the
workings of their host agencies and their "independence" from those agencies.
But "independence" is not a statutorily defined term. As the agencies, and

sometimes Congress itself, expand the role of IGs to engage in activities that
parallel the regulatory programs of their host agencies, IG independence is
compromised and the value IGs provide to Congress can be undermined. This

article seeks to further a project of scholarship on IGs focusing on the statutory
framework within which they operate and the conflicting imperatives that affect
their work.
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"Are you my Inspector General? When I was Governor of Pennsylvania, I
had an Inspector General, but he wasn't out there like you, constantly
criticizing and embarrassing us."

The Department of Transportation ("DOT") Office of Inspector General
("OIG") website lists enforcement priorities in order of importance. 2 "[E]nhanc
[ing] DOT's transportation safety goals by investigating crimes where death or
serious bodily injury has or is likely to occur"3 is at the top of the list. According
to the website, OIG's investigations of rule violations-and the prosecutions that
result-"complement the regulatory enforcement programs of DOT's Operating
Administrations." 4
There is no doubt that the DOT OIG's activities "complement[ing DOT's]
enforcement programs" are important. But there is also no reason they should be
undertaken by an Inspector General ("IG"), rather than by the agency itself or by

1.

CHARLES

A.

JOHNSON ET AL.,

IBM

CENTER FOR Bus. & GOV'T, BALANCING INDEPENDENCE AND

POSITIVE ENGAGEMENT: HOw INSPECTORS GENERAL WORK WITH AGENCIES AND CONGRESS

26 (2015)
(2006))

(quoting CLARK KENT ERVIN, OPEN TARGET: WHERE AMERICA IS VULNERABLE TO ATTACK 39

[hereinafter HOw INSPECTORS GENERAL WORK].
2.

U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP.: OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN.,

oig.dot.gov/investigations/oig-investigative-priorities

OIG

INVESTIGATIVE PRIORITIES, https://www.

[https://perma.cc/JL55-PH2B].

3. Id.
4. Id. Additional examples of "parallel enforcement" are described in more detail infra. note 211 et

seq. Sec. II.B.
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the Department of Justice. The core mission of the IG is to assist Congress with
its constitutional oversight role.5 Additional activities, even worthwhile and necessary ones, raise serious questions about IG independence and interfere with this
important institution's core purpose. For an OIG to do its work effectively and as
Congress intended, it must retain its independence-which is threatened by "regulatory enforcement" activities.
INTRODUCTION

The Constitution is silent about Congressional oversight, but it is among the
chief responsibilities of the legislative branch.6 Inspectors General are among
Congress' most important tools for overseeing government because IGs are hardwired into the Executive Branch.7 They are the "eyes and ears" 8 of the public
inside federal agencies. After more than forty years, they have deep relationships
(or the capacity to form deep relationships) with their congressional committees
of jurisdiction and deep expertise in the workings of their host agencies.
IGs are a unique institution within the Executive Branch, so there is no single
lens through which to study them. IGs are not featured in Administrative Law
casebooks, and research into their work tends to focus on their history or management role,10 rather than on their unique function as an arm of Congressional
oversight with all the attendant complexities." This article furthers a project of

5. See infra Sec. I.
6. See Trump v. Mazars, 140 S.Ct. 2019, 2031 (2020) ("Congress has no enumerated constitutional
power to conduct investigations ...
but we have held that each House has power 'to secure needed
information' in order to legislate.") (internal citations omitted). The "power of inquiry-with process to
enforce it-is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function." Id. Without information,
"Congress would be shooting in the dark, unable to legislate 'wisely or effectively."' Id.

7. See 166 CONG. REC. S3,88-89 (daily ed. June 18, 2020) (prepared remarks of Sen. Grassley)
(Congress "cannot perform [its] constitutional mandate of oversight without [IGs]") [hereinafter
statement of Sen. Grassley].
8. 161 CONG. REC. 20,168 (2015) (statement of Sen. Johnson, Chairman, S. Comm. on Homeland
Sec. & Governmental Aft) [hereinafter Sen. Johnson statement].
9.

See generally MICHAEL ASIMOW & RONALD M. LEVIN, STATE AND FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE

LAW (5th ed. 2020) (no references to IGs in table of contents or index); STEPHEN G. BREYER ET AL.,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY: PROBLEMS, TEXT, AND CASES (8th ed. 2017) (no
references to IGs in table of contents); RONALD A. CASS ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: CASES AND
MATERIALS (8th ed. 2020) (no references to IGs in teacher's manual); JERRY L. MASHAW ET AL.,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, THE AMERICAN PUBLIC LAW SYSTEM, CASES AND MATERIALS (8th ed. 2020) (no
references to IGs in table of contents; briefly discussed at pp.140-41); ANDREW F. POPPER ET AL.,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: A CONTEMPORARY APPROACH (3d ed. 2016) (no references to IGs in table of
contents or index); JoHN M. ROGERS ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (4th ed. 2020) (no references to IGs
in table of contents or teacher's manual); BERNARD SCHWARTZ ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: A
CASEBOOK (9th ed. 2018) (no references to IGs in teacher's manual).
10. See infra note 21. Earlier literature on Inspectors General is cited in William Fields, The Enigma
of Bureaucratic Accountability, 43 Cath. U. L. Rev. 505 (1994) (reviewing Paul C. Light, MONITORING
GOVERNMENT:

INSPECTORS GENERAL AND THE SEARCH FOR ACCOUNTABILITY (1993)

[hereinafter

MONITORING GOVERNMENT]).

11. One exception is "The Role of Inspectors General in Congressional Oversight," conference
sponsored by the Levin Center at Wayne Law (June 13, 2018), available at https://law.wayne.edu/levincenter/conferences#definition-76226 (last visited August 28, 2020) (Inspectors General are "absolutely
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scholarship on IGs as institutions of oversight and accountability by analyzing
the statutory framework within which they operate and the conflicting imperatives that affect their work. The theoretical "duality" of the IG role is the issue
here: furthering Congressional interest in independent and accurate information about the workings of the Executive Branch, while simultaneously providing additional enforcement capacity and management expertise to their
host agencies. Additional scholarship focusing on the unique issues raised by
these institutions-including their appointment, nomination, tenure, and the
question of "who watches the watchers?"" 2-is touched upon here but merits
more detailed consideration.
IGs do their job in two ways: (1) retroactively auditing; ensuring compliance;
and surfacing waste, fraud, and abuse in the government and (2) prospectively
recommending best practices to their agencies. IGs enjoy overwhelming bipartisan support in Congress because they provide quick access to relevant information about how the government is doing its job; prevent billions of dollars in
waste, fraud and abuse; and conduct investigations and audits that protect the
lives of the American public.13 IGs must retain their independence to do their
work effectively and as Congress intended,1 4 but because "independence" is not a
statutorily defined term, it ends up meaning whatever individual IGs intend it to
mean in the process of operationalizing their responsibilities. In a sense, "independence" is in the eye of the beholder. Some reformers believe that IGs should
have independence to conduct activities as they see fit, help their agencies perform better, and cooperate extensively in doing so." This sort of "operational" independence expands the IGs' scope of influence within the agency, but it can also
compromise the office's ability to do its work. 16 If an "independent" IG pursues
activities that overlap substantially with those of the agency it is required to

critical" to Congress, "independence" is important but hard to define, "independent decision-making is

the IG's responsibility").
12. See infra notes 137-138 and accompanying text. See also PROJECT ON Gov'T OVERSIGHT,
5-6 (discussing "the issue of
accountability of federal Inspectors General") (2008) [hereinafter LACK ESSENTIAL TOOLS]. See also
Wendy J. Gordon, Norms of Communication and Commodification, 144 Penn. L. Rev. 2321, 2323
(1996) (discussing how "legal intermediaries have power and privileges that largely immunize them
from scrutiny."); and 2324 (asking "who watches the watchers").
INSPECTORS GENERAL: MANY LACK ESSENTIAL TOOLS FOR INDEPENDENCE

13. See infra notes 82, 112, 117, 136, 168, 200 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 18, 20, 133, 177 and accompanying text.
15. See Alice N. Rivlin, Inspector General Vision Statement; Inspectors General Vision and

Strategies to Apply to Our Reinvention Principles, 43 THE Gov'T ACCT. J. 9 (1994) (IGs are "agents of
positive change striving for continuous improvement in our agencies' management and program
operations."); see also Memorandum from Alice Rivlin, Deputy Dir., Exec. Off. of the President,
Inspector General Vision Statement. to Program Associate Directors, Deputy Associate Directors, and

OMB

Branch Chiefs (Apr. 11, 1994) (on file with author); The Inspector General Act of 1978: Twenty

Years After Passage, are the Inspectors General Fulfilling Their Mission? Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Govt. Mgmt., Info., & Tech. of the H. Comm. on Govt. Reform & Oversight, 105th
Congress 17 (1998) [hereinafter "Twenty Years After the Act"] (statement of Sen. John Glenn) ("Agents
of 'Positive Change' in a Brave New World.").
16. See discussion infra Sec. II.C.
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oversee, it may be doing so "independently"-but it is no longer, in fact, independent from the agency.
Ultimately, independence is critical to oversight efficacy because it ensures objectivity and credibility in delivering information and recommendations to
Congress. According to former Defense Department IG Eleanor Hill: "Military
IGs [constantly] recognized that in investigations of very senior officials or in
audits of programs dear to the agency head, the statutorily protected independence of the Departmental IG was critical to both the integrity of the inquiry and to
the credibility of the findings."" Moreover, without independence, IGs have-or
might develop-conflicts of interest with the agencies they are supposed to oversee. Without independence, IGs are just another part of the agencies they oversee.
For these reasons, the Inspector General Act of 1978 ("IG Act"), as amended,
promotes and facilitates IG independence. 18 IGs have their own staff, counsel,
budgets, and autonomy. 19 IGs report to Congress, not just to their agency head.20
Despite the importance of independence, IGs have the discretion-and sometimes decide-to work together with their host and other agencies to undertake
programmatic responsibilities and sometimes, to enforce laws against members
of the public, a practice this article calls "parallel enforcement. "21 Parallel
enforcement creates a conflict of interest that is inconsistent with the spirit
and purpose of the IG Act, undermining IG independence and potentially
compromising Congressional oversight. Parallel enforcement also potentially
creates operational confusion and the appearance of due process concerns for
members of the public, who must respond to separate investigators for the
same operative facts. Moreover, parallel enforcement may confuse agency

17. LACK ESSENTIAL TOOLS 8 (citing Strengthening the Unique Role of the Nation's Inspectors
General: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Governmental Aff., 110th Cong. 19-20
(2007) (statement of Eleanor Hill, Inspector Gen., U.S. Dep't of Defense)).

18. Inspector General Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-452, 92 Stat. 1101 (1978) (codified as amended at
5 U.S.C. app. §§ 113). [Hereinafter "IG Act" or "1978 Act."]
19. See infra note 76 and accompanying text.
20. 5 U.S.C. app. §§ 2, 45. "For IGs, the two primary stakeholders with legal authority over them,
and to whom they officially report, are Congress and the leadership in their home agency." CHARLES A.
JOHNSON & KATHRYN E. NEWCOMER, U.S. INSPECTORS

GENERAL: TRUTH TELLERS IN TURBULENT

TIMES 114 (2020) [hereinafter TRUTH TELLERS]. One former IG famously called this "straddling a
barbed wire fence." LACK ESSENTIAL TOOLS, supra note 17 at 10 (quoting Serious Management
Problems in the U.S. Government: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on Governmental Aff. 101 Cong. 55
(1989) (statement of Sherman Funk, Inspector General, U.S. Dep't of State): MONITORING
GOVERNMENT supra note 10 at 69; see also TRUTH TELLERS, supra at 140 (OIG interviewees "offered
other metaphors-dancing on a tight rope, walking the line, and walking through a mine field-which
convey the crosscutting pressures of reporting to an agency head and to Congress."). "[The Hill] tend[s]
to regard IGs as patsies who sell out regularly to agency management, [and] agency managers tend to
regard IGs as finks who leak to Congress on a daily basis." Twenty Years After the Act, supra note 15,
(testimony of Sherman M. Funk, Inspector Gen., U.S. Dep't of Com. and U.S. Dep't of State).
21. The term refers to any activity undertaken cooperatively by the Office of Inspector General ("OIG")
and the host agency focusing on a common target. The principal focuses are regulatory enforcement and
investigations focusing outside the host agency or its direct spending, but can also encompass cooperative
efforts to improve agency performance or other policy objectives. See infra Sec. II.
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employees and the public when it comes to operational integrity and potential
whistleblower reporting.
For these reasons, agencies and their IGs should maintain operational independence in enforcement matters as a matter of policy and practice. IGs should
develop guidelines and principles for determining whether to engage in activities
that programmatically align them with agencies they oversee. IGs could develop
those guidelines on their own or through the Council of Inspectors General for
Integrity and Efficiency ("CIGIE")-which convenes IGs and other oversight
professionals across the federal government-if it were granted rulemaking
authority for this purpose.2 2 If necessary, Congress should amend the IG Act to
scale back extraneous obligations imposed on IGs and clarify that IGs should not
ordinarily cooperate in investigations or activities alongside agencies they oversee (or other agencies).
This article proceeds in three sections. Section I outlines the role of
Inspectors General, focusing on their unique value to Congressional oversight. The Section explains why IG independence is essential for the offices
to perform as intended after explaining the Inspector General Act of 1978 and
describing the offices' core functions. Section II describes "parallel enforcement" or the practice of IGs expanding beyond audits and investigations of
the agencies they oversee (whether authorized by law or through individual
IG discretion to interpret their roles more expansively). Although IGs are
generally forbidden from engaging in programmatic activities, the line
between core functions and agency enforcement can be blurry and require
judgment calls that are easily made in favor of expanding the scope of activity. This Section provides case studies of parallel enforcement and then
explains why the practice violates the letter and spirit of the IG Act by entangling IGs with the agencies they oversee on behalf of Congress. This kind of
entanglement creates the potential for operational, public, and, potentially,
whistleblower confusion, challenging the IG's independence and ability to
oversee their agency. Finally, Section III provides potential solutions to
address the challenge to IG independence and to robust Congressional oversight posed by parallel enforcement.
I. THE

INSPECTOR GENERAL AS AN ARM OF CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT

This Section explains the origin of Inspectors General, their core functions,
and the reasons IGs must be independent from their host agencies in order to perform as Congress intended. It begins with background on the creation of

22. CIGIE was created by the Inspector General Reform Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-409, §7(a),
122 Stat. 4306 (2008) (codified at 5 U.S.C. app. §11) [hereinafter IG Reform Act]. CIGIE "is an
independent entity established within the executive branch to address integrity, economy and
effectiveness issues that transcend individual Government agencies and aid in the establishment of a
professional, well-trained and highly skilled workforce in the Offices of Inspectors General." https://

ignet.gov/ (last visited Sept. 4, 2020).
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Inspectors General. 23 It proceeds to describe the sort of work IGs perform and
then explains why independence from agency operations is so essential to IGs
performing the role Congress intended.
Congressional "oversight of administration" is not in the text of the
Constitution, but such an omission does not make the role any less real or important. Courts 4 and scholars 5 have pointed to a number of constitutional provisions
that imply congressional authority to oversee the Executive Branch-including
the Appropriations Power,26 the Organization Power, the power to "make all
laws for carrying into execution,' 28 the Necessary and Proper clause, 29 and the
Confirmation30 and Impeachment31 powers.
The Supreme Court has rejected retroactive, unicameral oversight of agency
actions3 2 and interference by Congress in the removal of federal officers.33 So,

23. There are two types of IGs under the IG Act. "Establishment" IGs are appointed by the President
with Senate confirmation. "Designated Federal Entity" IGs are appointed by the agency head, which
may be an individual, a board, or a commission. See COUNCIL OF INSPECTORS GENERAL ON INTEGRITY
AND EFFICIENCY, THE INSPECTORS GENERAL 2 (2014). This article does not differentiate between the
two types because the problem discussed is equally manifested in both.
24. See Trump v. Mazars, 140 S.Ct. 2019, 2031 (The congressional power to obtain information is

"broad" and "indispensable." (citing Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 187, 215 (1957))). It
encompasses inquiries into the administration of existing laws, studies of proposed laws, and "surveys of
defects in our social, economic or political system for the purpose of enabling the Congress to remedy
them." Id. See also Comm. on the Judiciary, U.S. House of Representatives v. McGahn, 968 F.3d 755,
760 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (en banc) ("The Constitution charges Congress with certain responsibilities,
including ... to conduct oversight of the federal government ... "); McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S.
135, 153 (1927) ("The power of inquiry-with process to enforce it-is an essential and appropriate
auxiliary to the legislative function").
25. Woodrow Wilson wrote in his classic treatise on Congress, "Quite as important as lawmaking is
vigilant oversight of administration." WOODROW WILSON, CONGRESSIONAL GOVERNMENT: A STUDY IN
AMERICAN POLITICS 297 (1885). See also Carl Levin & Elise J. Bean, Defining Congressional Oversight
and Measuring Its Effectiveness, 64 Wayne L. Rev. 1, 12 (2018) ("The power to investigate plays an
essential role in every aspect of the legislative function"). Importantly, "because oversight interactions
between Congress and the Executive almost universally occur without any judicial involvement, as a
functional matter, the likelihood of judicial involvement is remote." Andrew McCanse Wright,

Constitutional Conflict and Congressional Oversight, 98 Marq. L. Rev. 881, 893 (2014).
26. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7.
27. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9; U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
28. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
29. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
30. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
31. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4.
32. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 952-54 (1983) (finding that that all exercises of legislative
power that affect the rights, duties, and relations of persons outside the legislative branch must satisfy
the constitutional requirements of bicameralism and presentment of a bill or resolution to the President
for his signature or veto). "[I]nformal" legislative vetoes occur when an executive official pledges not to
proceed with an activity absent congressional or committee approval. Id.

33. See Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, No. 19-7 2020, WL 3492641, at *23 (U.S. 2020).
Ionically, the president's power to remove Executive branch officials without congressional interference was
inferred by Chief Justice (and former president) William Taft based on the "take care" clause without any other
textual basis. Myers v United States, 272 U.S. 52, 163-64 (1926). The Constitution sets forth requirements for
appointment, Art II, § 2, but is silent on removal. This has created all sorts of difficulties with respect to IG
independence, most notably when President Trump removed or demoted several IGs without explanation other
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Congress exercises oversight through the appropriations process34 and by "hardwiring" control over agencies through the authorization process to shape the
agency's scope of work, duties, and procedures, which is an exercise of its power
to organize the government. In order to exercise these tools and ensure agencies
do what they are supposed to do, Congress is left with a range of indirect tools, all
of which rely on obtaining accurate and timely information. 36
For instance, Congress has enacted a range of reporting requirements for federal
agencies. Though these requirements are usually specific to a particular agency, a
few apply more generally. The Government Performance and Review Act requires
the head of each agency to provide Congress with a periodic "strategic plan" containing a mission statement and the agency's "general goals and objectives."3
Similarly, the Congressional Review Act requires that an agency submit a report to
each chamber of Congress before a proposed rule can take effect. 38

than claiming he had the power to do so. See Laura Spector, Spring Cleaning or Spring Purge?, https://
oversightproject.org/2020/06/12/spring-cleaning-or-spring-purge-independent-inspectors-general-needcongressional-protection/ (last visited Nov. 22, 2020). See also Letter from Pat A. Cippollone, Counsel
to the President, to Sen. Charles Grassley (R-IA), dated May 26, 2020, available at https://www.

grassley.senate.gov/sites/default/files/2020-05-26%20White%20House%20Counsel%20to%20CEG%
20%28IC%20IG%20and%20State%20IG%29.pdf (last visited Nov. 22, 2020) ("When the President
loses confidence in an inspector general, he will exercise his constitutional right and duty to remove

that officer. . . ").
34. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 9, cl. 7. Congress arguably relies on appropriations acts as a form of
legislative veto. See CONG. RSCH SERV., CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT MANUAL, RL30240, 68-69
(2020).
35. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 9; U.S. CONST., art. II, § 2, cl. 2. See also Kendall v. United States ex rel.
Stokes, 37 U.S. 524 (1838) (holding that Congress has the right to prescribe duties to subordinate
officers of the Executive branch).

36. Lloyd-La Follette Act of 1912 (Anti-Gag Legislation), 37 Stat. 555 (1912) (codified at 5 U.S.C.
(2006)) (ensures availability of information); Whistleblower Protection Act of 1978, 5 U.S.C. §

§ 7211

2302 (b)(8) (ensures availability of information); Intelligence Community Whistleblower Protection
Act, Pub. L. No. 105-272 (ensures availability of information); Consolidated Appropriations Act 2010,

Pub. L. No. 111-117,

§ 714,

123 Stat. 3034 (2010) (prohibits the payment of the salary of any officer or

employee of the Federal Government who prohibits or prevents or attempts or threatens to prohibit or
prevent, any other Federal officer or employee from having direct oral or written communication with
Congress); Id. at § 716 (2010) (prohibits the expenditure of any appropriated funds for use in
implementing or enforcing non-disclosure agreements). See McGahn, 968 F.3d at 760 ("Possession of
relevant information is an essential precondition to the effective discharge of all [the] duties" with
which "[t]he Constitution charges Congress ... ") (emphasis supplied); McGrain, 273 U.S. at 174 ("the
power of inquiry-with process to enforce it-is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative
function."). See also Matthew D. McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, Congressional Oversight
Overlooked: Police Patrols Versus Fire Alarms, CONGRESS, STRUCTURE AND POLICY 426, 427-30
(Matthew D. McCubbins & Terry Sullivan eds., 1987) (highlighting congressional reliance on outside
information to conduct oversight); Patricia M. Wald & Jonathan R. Siegel, The D.C. Circuit and the

Struggle for Control of Presidential Information, 90 GEO. L.J. 737, 739 (2002) (emphasizing Congress'
need for information to conduct oversight).

37. 5 U.S.C.§ 306 (2020).
38.

CONG. RSCH. SERV., R43992, THE CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW ACT (CRA): FREQUENTLY ASKED

QUESTIONS, 1 (2020). Agencies could potentially frustrate this oversight mechanism, as the CRA bars
judicial review. Id. at 12. If the agency does not designate the action as a rule, it can circumvent the
requirement for Congressional submission. In such cases, Congress can ask for the Government
Accountability Office (GAO) to review the action and determine whether it constitutes a rule as defined
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The Government Accountability Office (GAO) is another channel through
which Congress conducts oversight and obtains information. Congress established the GAO as an auditor of government activities and agencies in the Budget
and Accounting Act of 1921.39 The Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970 further authorized the GAO to "evaluate the results of a program or activity the
Government carries out under existing law"4 0 at Congress's request. The GAO
was created to be "independent of the executive departments" and was given
audit and review powers over the departments. 41
The Inspector General Act of 1978 is the most important mechanism for
Congress to obtain information and oversight analysis from inside the government
on a regular basis. The Act enhances Congress's ability to monitor government performance.4 2 The structure reflects Congress's understanding of "oversight committees'
limited ability to effectively monitor and assess agency programs and enforcement
responsibilities in a timely, on the spot manner."'3
A. Statutory Creationand Relation to Congress

The early 1970s produced a number of important government reforms. 44
During this period, Congress enacted legislative reorganization 45 and reforms to

by the CRA. A determination by the GAO that the action constitutes a rule allows Congress to move
forward with its review of the rule, without a formal submission by the agency. Id. Congress rarely
disapproves a rule, and even less frequently through the GAO disapproval process. Id.

39. Budget and Accounting Act of 1921, Pub. L. No. 67-13, 42 Stat. 20 ch. 18 (1921); see also U.S.
GoV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO PAST AND PRESENT 1921 THROUGH THE 1990s 1.

40. 31 U.S.C. § 717(b). See also U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-17-767G, GAO's
CONGRESSIONAL PROTOCOLS 34 (2017).
41.

FREDERICK M. KAISER, CONG. RSCH. SERV., RL3034, GAO: GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY

OFFICE AND GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE 12 (2008).

42. 1978 Act §§ 1-13. See also Carl Levin & Elise J. Bean, Defining Congressional Oversight and
Measuring Its Effectiveness, 64 Wayne L. Rev. 1, 13 (2018) ("IGs can provide inside information about
the agencies they review...."); WENDY GINSBERG & MICHAEL GREEN, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R43814,
FEDERAL INSPECTORS

GEN.:

HISTORY,

CHARACTERISTICS,

AND

RECENT CONGRESSIONAL

(2016); WENDY GINSBERG, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R43722, OFFICES OF INSPECTORS

ACTIONS

GEN. AND LAW

ENFORCEMENT AUTHORITY (2014); COUNCIL OF THE INSPECTORS GEN. ON INTEGRITY AND EFFICIENCY,
PRESIDENTIAL TRANSITION HANDBOOK: THE ROLE OF INSPECTORS GEN. AND THE TRANSITION TO A NEW
ADMINISTRATION (2016).
43.

MORTON ROSENBERG,

WHEN

CONGRESS

COMES

CALLING: A

STUDY

ON THE PRINCIPLES,

PRACTICES, AND PRAGMATICS OF LEGISLATIVE INQUIRY 103 (2017). Perhaps, by assigning oversight
responsibilities to Inspectors General, Congress enabled the President-rather than the IGs-to
substitute Executive decision for that of the statutorily designated officials. See Elena Kagan,

PresidentialAdministration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2322-23 (2001) (concluding it likely that
"Congress may limit the President's capacity to direct administrative officials in the exercise of their
substantive discretion."). The question remains whether robust oversight through Inspectors General
represents needed expertise or unduly impinges on presidential administration. "The history of the
American administrative state is the history of competition among different entities for control of its
policies." Id. at 2246. The same might be said about the history of oversight of the American
administrative state.
44. See generally MONITORING GOVERNMENT, supra note 10.
45. Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970, Pub. L. 91-510, 84 Stat. 1140, codified at scattered
sections of 2 U.S.C. et seq. (providing greater transparency for the operation of the legislative branch).
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both the Government Accountability Office 46 and to the War Powers Resolution.47
Although there were some predecessors, 48 the modern inspector general was a product of this period as well, first at the Department of Health, Education and Welfare 49
and later, at the Department of Energy.50 The Inspector General Act of 1978-which
passed the House with only six opposing votes and passed the Senate unanimously"-sought to further reorganize audit functions inside the government. It
provided a mechanism for "keeping the agency head and the Congress informed
about serious problems and deficiencies and ... recommending necessary corrective
action."5 2 The lead Senate sponsor of the Act referred to the concept of an inspector
general as "the consolidation of auditing and investigative responsibilities under a
single high-level official reporting directly to the head of the establishment."

46. Id., 84 Stat. 1170 (authorizing GAO to conduct program evaluations and analyses of a broad
range of federal activities). See supra note 40 and accompanying text.

47. War Powers Resolution, Pub. L. 93-148, 87 Stat. 555, codified at 50 U.S.C.

§§

1541-48.

48. The "modern" inspector general authorized by Congress traces back to the 1962 Department of
Agriculture. Legislation to Establish Offices of Inspector Gen.: Hearing on H.R. 8588 Before the
Subcomm. on Governmental Efficiency & the D.C. of the S. Comm. on Governmental Aff., 95th Cong. 5
(1978) (statement of Rep. Lawrence H. Fountain) [hereinafter Hearing on H.R. 8558]. The necessity for
legislation was occasioned by a scandal at the Department of Agriculture that had been difficult to end
because investigations were uncoordinated and poorly managed and reported to officials directly
responsible for the program being reviewed. See Twenty Years After the Act, supra note 615, (1998)
(statement of James R. Naughton, counsel, Intergovernmental Relations & Hum. Res. Subcomm., H.
Comm. on Gov't Operations) Res. Subcomm., H. Comm. on Gov't Operations). Congress had
previously established a Department of State "Inspector General and Comptroller" in 1959. Mutual
Security Act of 1959, Pub. L. 86-108, 73 Stat. 246, 253. See MONITORING GOVERNMENT, supra note 10,
("Created under the 1959 amendments to the Mutual Security Act, the IG was appointed by the secretary
of state and held the title 'inspector general and comptroller."').

49. Hearing on H.R. 8558, supra note 48; See Act of Oct. 15, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-505,

§ 201,

90

Stat. 2429, 2429 (establishing the Office of Inspector General for the Department of Health, Education,
and Welfare).

50. See Department of Energy Organization Act, Pub. L. No. 95-91,

§ 208,

91 Stat. 565, 575 (1977)

(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 7138) (establishing Office of Inspector General within the new
Department of Energy).
51. Twenty Years After the Act, supra note 15, 105th Congress 81 (1998) (testimony of Sherman M.
Funk, Inspector Gen., U.S. Dep't of Com. & U.S. Dep't of State). IG legislation had "strong bipartisan
support from the very beginning." Twenty Years After the Act, supra note 15, 105th Congress 24 (1998)
(statement of James R. Naughton, counsel, Intergovernmental Relations & Hum. Res. Subcomm., H.
Comm. on Gov't Operations).

52. 124 CONG. REC. 10,400 (1978) (statement of Rep. Fountain) (emphasis supplied). Viewing
Congressional "oversight" broadly, it includes "efforts to gather information about what agencies are
doing and to dictate or signal to agencies regarding the preferred behavior or policy." CHRISTOPHER H.
FOREMAN, SIGNALS FROM THE HILL: CONGRESSIONAL

OVERSIGHT AND THE CHALLENGE OF SOCIAL

REGULATION 13 (1988).

53. 124 CONG. REC. 30,952 (1978) [hereinafter statement of Sen. Eagleton] Importantly, both offices
were expressly not authorized to undertake "program operating responsibilities." CONG. RSCH. SERV.,

R45450,

STATUTORY

INSPECTORS

GEN.

IN

THE FEDERAL

GOVERNMENT:

A PRIMER

1-2

(2019)

[hereinafter STATUTORY INSPECTORS GENERAL]. The term "program operating responsibilities" is not
defined in the statute or elsewhere in the legislative history, but it refers to the fundamental operations
performed by the host agency. See infra n.127 and accompanying text. "The Inspector General Act, as
amended, prohibits statutory inspectors general from performing program operating responsibilities but
does not define those responsibilities." U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO/AFMD-89-68,
INSPECTORS GEN.: ADEQUACY OF

TVA'S

INSPECTOR GEN. 9 (1989).
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The Inspector General Act of 1978 consolidated existing audit and investigative units inside various federal agencies, divested them of "program operating
responsibilities,"" and established them as new offices of inspectors general
inside each agency." The purpose of OIGs to conduct audits and investigations
of the agencies' programs and operations, provide leadership and coordination,
and recommend policies that promote efficiency and prevent fraud and
abuse. 56 Inspectors general were expected to "provide a means for keeping
agency heads and the Congress fully and currently informed"5 7 about problems and deficiencies. Congress was especially concerned about interference
from the Executive Branch, so it required that reports and information be submitted "without further clearance or approval."58 Then-Chairman of the House
Committee on Government Operations L.H. Fountain (D-NC) acknowledged that
"Presidents ... don't want Congress seeking out or getting information statutorily. ... "9
At the time of its enactment, the Executive Branch expressed concern
about the proposed new offices. In testimony before the House Committee on
Government Operations, Department of Labor Comptroller Al Zuck objected to
the proposed reporting requirement on the basis that it would impose a separate
reporting channel that was parallel to the existing channel for the General
Accounting Office (the predecessor to the modern GAO).60 He argued that the
GAO could sufficiently meet Congress's need for information because of its
"complete access to all [agency] accounts" and its ability "presently .

.

. to inform

Congress regarding any facet of our program."61 He argued that the new offices

54. 5 U.S.C. app. §§ 8G(b), 9(a)(2).
55. H.R. Rep. No. 95-584, at 2 (1977). The House Report accompanying the Act states:
"While Inspectors General would have direct responsibility for conducting audits and investigations relating to the efficiency and economy of program operations and the prevention and detection of fraud and abuse in such programs, they would not have such responsibility for audits and
investigationsconstitutingan integralpart of the programs involved."

Id. at 12-13 (emphasis added).
56. H.R. Rep. No. 95-584, at 2. See also Hearing on H.R. 8558, supra note 48 (statement of Thomas
D. Morris, Inspector General, Dep't of Health, Educ., and Welfare) ("The purposes are ...
to conduct
objective factfinding and to make meaningful recommendations, not to make program or policy
decisions which are the responsibilityofline management.") (emphasis added).
57. H.R. Rep. No. 95-584, at 2. Keeping Congress "currently informed," as the IG statute requires,
is a challenge for OIGs regarding when to share information and what information to share.How
INSPECTORS GENERAL WORK, supra note 1, at 20.

58. See H.R. Rep. No. 95-584, at 3.
59. Establishment of Offices of Inspector General: Hearings on H.R. 2819 Before the Subcomm. on
IntergovernmentalRelations & Hum. Res. of the H. Comm. on Gov't Operations, 95th Cong. 165 (1977)
[hereinafter Hearings on H.R. 2819]. Congressman Fountain was one of the leading proponents of
independent Inspectors General, arguing that existing government auditing offices were "too scattered
and understaffed to be effective and that they lacked independence because they reported to and were
hired and fired by officials directly responsible for the programs being investigated." How INSPECTORS
GENERAL WORK, supra note 1, at 9.

60. Hearings on H.R. 2819, supra note 59.
61. Id.
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of inspectors general would "serve two masters" and could "lead to a disruption
of a smooth-working management team ... " 62 Instead, "Congress [could] be provided needed information without" these drawbacks to a direct line to an independent inspector general63 . Congress's intent.
Congress disagreed The Senate Report accompanying the Inspector General
Act of 1978 demonstrates Congress's contrary intent." Recognizing an inspector
general's "unique function" as only "in part" that of "an executive official,"
Congress conferred upon the office a "unique status within the Executive
Branch.'' 6 While the heads of agencies ordinarily have the right to review communications of their agencies before transmittal to Congress, the Inspector
General Act of 1978 made inspectors general "the only . . . Executive Branch ...
Presidential appointee who speaks directly to Congress without clearance. ."..66
This direct responsibility to Congress resolved a criticism of previous auditing
offices. One of the earliest proponents for the creation of the offices of inspectors
general argued that existing auditing offices within federal agencies "lacked independence because they reported to and were hired and fired by officials directly
responsible for the programs being investigated.'' 67 According to this line of criticism, working with officials responsible for agency programs undermined the independence of audit and investigative personnel. 68 Reflecting this concern, the
Inspector General Act of 1978 emphasized the establishment of "independent
and objective units.'' 69 Carl Levin and Elise Bean's seminal article on congressional oversight refers to inspectors general being "explicitly charged with

62.
63.
64.
65.

Id.
Id.
See S. Rep. No. 95-1071, at 30-31 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2676,2705-06.
Id. (emphasis added).

66. Margaret Gates & Marjorie Fine Knowles, The Inspector General Act in the Federal
Government: A New Approach to Accountability, 36 Ala. L. Rev. 473, 475 (1985) (emphasis in
original). Ultimately, the independence and influence of Inspectors General depends significantly on
conventions, not law. Inspectors General enjoy independence "because norms have evolved that protect
them beyond statutory provisions." Shirin Sinnar, Internal Oversight and the Tenuous Protection of

Norms, 93 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 61, 63 (2018); see also Adrian Vermeule, Conventions of Agency

&

Independence, 113 Colum. L. Rev. 1163 (2013) (focusing on regulatory agencies and their protection by
"conventions" that provide some measure of independence from Executive intervention).
67. Establishment of an Office of Inspector General in the Department of Health, Education, and
Welfare: Hearing on H.R. 5302 et. al. Before the Subcomm. on Intergovernmental Relations & Hum.
Res. of the H. Comm. on Gov't Operations, 94th Cong. 1-2 (1976) (statement of Rep. Lawrence H.
Fountain); see also Hearing on H.R. 8558, supra note 48 (testimony of Rep. Lawrence H. Fountain)
(Senator Eagleton: "[W]e want the Inspector General to inquire into matters of efficiency and economy
and potential illegality and fraud [but not] to intrude . . . into policymaking." Rep. Fountain: "Or
program operations.") (emphasis added). One of the congressional investigations leading to the creation
of the first Inspector General at the Department of Health, Education and Welfare had in fact unearthed
disturbing reports of interference with factfinding by the Secretary or Under Secretary. See Twenty Years
After the Act, supra note 15 (statement of James R. Naughton, counsel, Intergovernmental Relations
Hum. Res. Subcomm., H. Comm. on Gov't Operations).
68. Twenty Years After the Act, supra note 15 (statement of James R. Naughton, counsel,
Intergovernmental Relations & Hum. Res. Subcomm., H. Comm. on Gov't Operations).

69. 1978 Act at Sec. 2.
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assisting Congress in its oversight responsibilities," which sets them apart from
any other arm of the Executive Branch. 70
Since passage of the Inspector General Act of 1978, Congress has continuously
on a bipartisan basis augmented the role of independent inspectors general.71 The
Homeland Security Act of 2002 vested certain inspectors general with law
enforcement authority, including the power to carry a firearm; to make arrests
without a warrant; and to seek and execute warrants for arrest, search of premises,
or seizure of evidence.7 2 The Inspector General Reform Act of 2008 further dem-

onstrated congressional support for strong and independent inspectors general.
The Act established the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and
Efficiency (CIGIE), authorized inspectors general to obtain legal advice from
their own counsel, and required that the President's annual budget request to
Congress identify the requested budget amounts of the inspectors general separately within their respective agency budgets.73 Perhaps most significantly, the
Inspector General Empowerment Act of 2016 highlights a congressional response

70. Carl Levin & Elise J. Bean, Defining Congressional Oversight and Measuring Its Effectiveness,
64 WAYNE L. REV. 1, 14 (2018) (emphasis added).
71. See generally Inspector General Act Amendments of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-504, title I, §§102
(a)-(d), (f), (g), 104(a), 105-107, 109, 110, 102 Stat. 2515, 2515-29 (expanding total number of
statutory IGs, creating a new category for IGs for "designated federal entities," setting uniform salary
rates and separate appropriations); Intelligence Community Whistleblower Act, Pub. L. No. 105-272,

title VII, §702(b), 112 Stat. 2396, 2415 (1998); IG Reform Act, supra note 22, §§ 2-4(a)(1), 5, 6(a), (b),
7(a), (d)(1), 8, 9, 11-13(a), 14, 122 Stat. 4302, 4305, 4313-16 (establishing CIGIE, increasing salaries,
providing budget protection, access to independent legal counsel, and requiring advanced congressional
notification for the removal or transfer of IGs); Inspector General Empowerment Act of 2016, Pub. L.

No. 114-317, §§ 2, 3, 4(c)-6, 7(b)(1), (c), (d)(2), (3), 130 Stat. 1595-1606 (enhancing IG access to and
use of agency records and requiring IGs to submit any documents containing recommendations for
corrective action to agency heads and congressional committees of jurisdiction, as well as any Members
of Congress, upon request); Whistleblower Protection Coordination Act, Pub. L. No. 115-192, § 2(a)-

(c), 132 Stat. 1502, 1503 (2018). See also MONITORING GOVERNMENT, supra note 10 ("At the
same time Congress and the president increased the regulation of the federal government's employees,
the private sector began to embrace the management philosophy of W. Edwards Deming, which focused
on designing quality into a product at the front end of the process, instead of inspecting it at the back
end .... As biographer Mary Walton explained ...
'[q]uality comes not from inspection but from
improvement of the process.").

72. Pub. L. No. 107-296, § 812, 116 Stat. 2135, 2222-23 (codified at 5 U.S.C. app. § 6(f)). Some
Offices of Inspector General possessed law enforcement powers from the time they were established
through a transfer of functions and units that had already held them. Frederick M. Kaiser, Full Law
Enforcement Authority for Offices of Inspector Gen.: Causes, Concerns, and Cautions, 15 POLICE STUD.
INT'L REV. POLICE DEV. 75, 75 (1992). Other OIG investigators have acquired relevant authorities later,
through a specific statutory assignment. Id. Still other OIGs received law enforcement authorities
temporarily and indirectly; these have come from an outside (non-IG) source, either through a
delegation by the establishment head or through special deputation, as a Deputy United States Marshal.
Id. at 76. Under these different approaches, law enforcement authority was extended over time to a
number of personnel throughout the IG community. Id.

73. IG Reform Act, supra note 22 at §§2-4(a)(1), 5, 6(a), (b), 7(a), (d)(1), 8, 9, 11-13(a), 14, 122
Stat. 4302, 4302, 4305, 4313-16. The Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010)
(requiring GAO to report on IG implementation of these provisions). See U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY
OFF., GAO-1-770, INSPECTORS GEN.: REPORTING ON INDEPENDENCE, EFFECTIVENESS, AND EXPERTISE

(2011).
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to challenges to the independence of inspectors general arising from the
Executive Branch. After the FBI raised objections to providing the Inspector
General for the Department of Justice with access to statutorily protected information, forty-seven inspectors general wrote to Congress indicating their view
that meaningful oversight depends on "complete and timely access to all agency
materials." 74 Congress responded with appropriations language prohibiting the
Justice Department from denying its Inspector General access to information.7 5
When the Department nevertheless continued to refuse access, Congress reacted
by amending the Inspector General Act of 1978 to require agencies to provide
inspectors general with "timely access to all recordsof the agency. "76
Recent congressional committee chairmen attest to the role that inspectors general play in its Congress's oversight function today. The former Chairman of the
Senate Committee on the Judiciary has argued that Congress "cannot perform
[its] constitutional mandate of oversight without [inspectors general]. . . ." The
former Chairman of the House Committee on Oversight and Reform has argued
that "[i]f [inspectors general] can't do their job, [Congress] can't do [its] job."78
The former Chairman of the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs has argued that inspectors general are Congress's "best
partner[s] in rooting out waste, fraud, and abuse." 79
The frequency and quality of interactions between Congress and inspectors
general are critical to their success. "[I]nformation ... is the coin of the realm"
for Congress, and inspectors general provide "someone who give[s] regular input
... and irregular access" outside the channels of agency leadership. 80 Although
IGs are not Congress's only source of information concerning the operations of
the government, they lower the "cost" of oversight substantially. 81
For this reason, the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended, requires
inspectors general to provide Congress with semiannual reports about their activities, findings, and recommendations.8 2 These reports are first submitted to the

74. ROSENBERG, supra note 43, at 109 (emphasis added). See Access of Department of Justice
Inspector General to Certain Information Protected from Disclosure by Statute, 39 O.L.C. 12 (1985)
(referring to IG requests for information protected by grand jury secrecy, the Federal Wiretap Act, and
the Fair Credit Reporting Act).
75. ROSENBERG, supra note 43, at 109.
76. Id. at 110 (emphasis added). "The overall important legal outcome of the passage of the
Empowerment Act is that it is now certain that IGs can get all the information they need to do their jobs
and that committees and individual members are entitled to get every bit of information that IGs have."

Id.

at 112. See Inspector General Empowerment Act of 2016 Pub. L. No. 114-317, §§2, 3, 4(c)-6, 7(b)
(1), (c), (d)(2), (3), 130 Stat. 1595-1606 (2016).
77. See supra note 7, statement of Sen. Grassley.
78. Inspectors Gen.: Independence, Access and Authority: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on

Oversight & Gov't Reform, 114 Cong. 2 (2015) (opening statement of Rep. Chaffetz).
79. See supra note 8, statement of Sen. Johnson.
80. MONITORING GOVERNMENT, supra note 10, 56.
81. See id. ("[The IG Act] cut down on some of the spade work we would have to do, and let us go
directly to more detailed investigations.").

82. Inspector Gen. Act of 1978, 5 U.S.C. app. § 5 (a)-(b) (2020); See also CONG. RSCH. SERV.,
RL30240, CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT MANUAL 76 (2020).
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agency head, who must then submit the report, without alterations, 83 to Congress
within thirty days. 84 The IGs must also promptly report "particularly serious or
flagrant problems, abuses, or deficiencies" to the agency head. 85 In turn, the
agency head is required to submit this report to Congress within seven days. 86 For
example, in 2019 the EPA Office of Inspector General wrote one such "seven day
letter" in response to the agency Chief of Staff's refusal to fully cooperate with
an OIG investigation. 87 This reporting structure is critical to the IG's effective
processing of whistleblower complaints, especially in the intelligence community. There, a whistleblower is required to go through the IG to report an urgent
matter to Congress. 88 Intelligence Community IG Michael Atkinson followed
this procedure in reporting the whistleblower complaint that resulted in the
impeachment of President Donald Trump. 89 In addition, the IG is required to
report to Congress on management challenges facing the agency and on the
agency's progress in meeting those challenges. 90
Congressional committees and subcommittees hold frequent hearings to examine IG-related issues, often inviting IGs to testify or submit written statements. 91
Some of these hearings examine the operations of a specific agency. 92 On other
occasions, Congress examines broad questions affecting multiple agencies. 93 In
2014, several IGs voiced displeasure with constraints placed upon their access to
agency records. 94 In response to these complaints, the House of Representatives

83. Id.
84. 5 U.S.C. app.
MANUAL 76 (2020).

§ 5(c) (2020); see also CONG.

RSCH. SERV., RL30240, CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT

85. 5 U.S.C. app. § 5(d) (2020).
86. Id.
87. Letter from Charles J. Sheenan, Acting Inspector Gen., to Andrew R. Wheeler, EPA Adm'r, U.S.

Envtl. Prot. Agency (Oct. 29, 2019).
88. 5 U.S.C. app. 8H; (2020); 50 U.S.C. § 3033 (2012); see also MICHAEL E. DEVINE, CONG. RSCH
SERV., R45345, INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTIONS 2 (2019).

89. See Letter from Michael K. Atkinson, Inspector Gen. of the Intelligence Cmty., to Chairman
Richard Burr, S. Select Comm. on Intelligence, and Chairman Adam Schiff, H.R. Permanent Select

Comm. on Intelligence (Aug. 12, 2019).
90. 31 U.S.C. § 3516(d) (2012); COUNCIL OF THE INSPECTORS GENERAL ON INTEGRITY AND
QUALITY STANDARDS FOR FEDERAL OFFICES OF INSPECTORS GENERAL 36 (2012)
[hereinafter QUALITY STANDARDS].

EFFICIENCY,
91.

WENDY GINSBURG & MICHAEL GREENE, CONG. RSCH SERV., R43814, FEDERAL INSPECTORS

GENERAL: HISTORY, CHARACTERISTICS, AND RECENT CONGRESSIONAL ACTIONS (2016).

&

92. See ManagementChallenges and Oversight of Department of State and United States Agency for
International Development Programs: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on State, Foreign Operations,
Related Programs, 116th Cong. 3-5 (2019) (statement of Steve A. Linick, Inspector General, U.S. Dep't
of State).
93. Where Are All the Watchdogs? Addressing Inspector General Vacancies: Hearing Before the H.
Comm. on Oversight & Gov't Reform, 112th Cong., 2d Sess., 1-2 (2012) (examining how IG vacancies
affect the independence and integrity of OIGs).
94. Access to Justice: Does DOJ's Office of Inspector General Have Access to Information Needed
to Conduct Proper Oversight?:HearingBefore the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong., 2d Sess., 1
(2014) ("Restricting or delaying an inspector general's access to key materials in turn deprives Congress
and the American people of timely information with which to evaluate an agency's performance.")
(Statement of Rep. Goodlatte).
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Judiciary Committee held a hearing and invited some of these IGs to testify. 95
Congress similarly invites IGs to testify when considering IG-related legislation
and appropriations bills.96
Members of Congress also reach out to IGs for information regarding agency
and OIG operations. For instance, in 2017, the DOT IG issued a letter in response
to Senator Bill Nelson's request for information on whistleblower protections at
the DOT. 97 Members may also reach out to request that the IG open new inquiries. In February 2020, Senator Elizabeth Warren wrote to the Housing and
Urban Development ("HUD") IG requesting that the Office add an inquirywhether delays in the release of emergency funds to Puerto Rico violated federal
law-into its ongoing investigation of HUD's use of funds appropriated for disaster relief.98 In addition, IGs may inform Congress "using other appropriate
means" in instances of fraud and other serious problems relating to the agency's
programs or operations.99 For example, IGs have requested briefings with
Congress or congressional staff. Often these briefings are related to IG reports or
involve updating a committee on pressing matters in the course of an investigation or audit. In light of the 2019 Ukraine scandal, for instance, the Department of
State IG requested a briefing with the House of Representatives Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence to provide the committee with documents relevant to
the investigation. 00 IGs have also written to Congress to express concerns. In
2014, 47 of the then-72 statutory IGs signed a letter to Congress protesting the
administration's policy of restricting IG access to agency materials. 1 1
B. Core Functionsand Relevance to Congress

To carry out their mandate, IGs have broad authority to: conduct audits and
investigations; issue such reports as they believe appropriate; 10 2 access all records
and information of their host agency; 103 request assistance from other federal,
state, and local government agencies; 104 subpoena information and documents;10 5

95. Id.
96. See, e.g., Inspectors General: Independence and Integrity: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Gov't Mgmt., Org., & Procurement of the H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov't Reform, 110th Cong., 1st
Sess. (2007) (regarding proposed reforms in the Inspector General Reform Act of 2008).
97. See Letter from Calvin L. Scovel III, Inspector Gen., U.S. Dep't of Transp., to Sen. Bill Nelson

(Feb. 6, 2017).
98. Letter from Sen. Elizabeth Warren to Rae Oliver Davis, Inspector Gen., U.S. Dep't of Hous.ing

& Urb. Dev. (Feb. 7, 2020).
99. 5 U.S.C. app. 3 § 4(a)(5) (2020);

QUALITY STANDARDS,

supra note 9090 at 37.

100. Manu Raju et al., State Department inspector general requests urgent briefing on Ukraine with
congressional staff, https://www.cnn.com/2019/10/01/politics/deposition-delayed-impeachment-investigation/

index.html [https://perma.cc/77FA-LPJJ] (Oct. 2, 2019).
101. Access to Justice: Does DOJ's Office of Inspector GeneralHave Access to Information Needed
to ConductProperOversight?:Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary 113th Cong. 1 (2014).

102.
103.
104.
105.

5
5
5
5

U.S.C. app.
U.S.C. app.
U.S.C. app.
U.S.C. app.

§§ 2, 4. (2020).
§ 6(a)(1) (2020).
§ 6(a)(3) (2020).
§ 6(a)(4) (2020).
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administer oaths when taking testimony; 106 hire staff and manage their own
resources; 107 receive and respond to complaints from agency employees, whose
confidentiality is to be protected; 108 and implement an intra-agency cash incentive
award program for employee disclosures of waste, fraud, and abuse.109
Originally, IGs' work focused "almost solely on investigations [and] audits,"
viz., "detection of wrongdoing." 11 0 Later, IGs started to work on prevention
objectives. By 2017 virtually all IGs were conducting "other work focused on
improving program management, in addition to financial audits and investigations." 111 Still, much IG work is ultimately reactive to crises.1 1 2
While discerning the "roots of the IG Act is like making a geological dig,"
beneath the traditional explanations "is the burgeoning congressional demand for
information." 11 3 The IGs' principal responsibilities can be divided into two categories: (1) retrospective activities, such as conducting audits, inspections, and
investigations relating to agency programs, agency operations, and instances of
past misconduct or mismanagement; and (2) prospective activities, such as
(a) providing leadership and coordination and recommending policies to promote
the economy, efficiency, and effectiveness of these principles; (b) preventing waste,
fraud, and abuse; and (c) keeping the agency head and Congress fully and currently
informed about problems (and recommending corrective action where needed)." 4
As Paul Light points out, IGs have one fundamental tool-monitoring-and one
significant power, which is "complete access to information."115 In exercising their
multiple responsibilities, IGs are to keep Congress informed.116 Within this broad
mandate, the IG is given full discretion to undertake those investigations that are, in
the IG's judgment, "necessary or desirable."11 7
Generally, "an audit, inspection, or evaluation is conducted to examine organizational program performance and operations or financial management matters,

106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

111.
112.
113.

U.S.C. app. § 6(a)(5) (2020).
U.S.C. app. § 6(a)(7), (8), and (9) (2020).
U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8)(B) (2018).
U.S.C. § 4511. (2018).
TRUTH TELLERS, supra note 20 at 95.
Id.
Id. at 96.
MONITORING GOVERNMENT, supra note 10.
5
5
5
5

114. FREDERICK M. KAISER,

CONG.

RSCH SERV.,

98-379, STATUTORY OFFICES

GENERAL: PAST AND PRESENT 1 (2008); see also STATUTORY INSPECTORS GENERAL,

OF INSPECTOR

supra note

53 at 7

(categorizing IG reviews by type of analysis: (a) performance audits, inspections or evaluations for
programmatic compliance and prospective analysis and (b) investigations for individual misconduct).
Each OIG has a broad statutory mandate to "conduct ...
audits and investigations relating to the
programs and operations" of the agency and to "conduct ...
other activities ...
for the purpose of
promoting economy and efficiency in the administration of ... " the agency. 5 U.S.C. app. § 4(a)(1), (a)

(3) (2020). In addition, OIGs work with the U.S. Office of Special Counsel (OSC) to investigate alleged
reprisals against whistleblowers. See ROSENBERG, supra note 43, 104.
115. MONITORING GOVERNMENT, supra note 10, 16 ("They are to look, not act; recommend, not
implement.").

116. 5 U.S.C. App. 3 § 2(3).
117. 5 U.S.C. App. 3 § 6(a)(2).
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typically of a systemic nature."118 The IG Act's legislative history suggests that
such audits require three basic areas of inquiry:
(1) examinations of financial transactions, accounts, and reports and reviews
of compliance with applicable laws and regulations, (2) reviews of efficiency
and economy to determine whether the audited entity is giving due consideration to economical and efficient management, utilization, and conservation of
its resources and to minimum expenditure of effort, and (3) reviews of program results to determine whether programs or activities meet the objectives
established by Congress or the establishment. 119

IG audits are conducted in accordance with the Government Auditing Standards
established by the Comptroller General. 1 20 In addition, IGs coordinate with the

Comptroller General to avoid duplication in federal audits. 121 IGs are charged not only
with investigating or auditing fraud, waste, and abuse after they have occurred, but
also with identifying vulnerabilities and recommending programmatic changes that
would, when enacted or implemented, strengthen controls or mitigate risk. IGs establish criteria for using non-federal auditors (typically, Certified Public Accountant
firms) and ensure that such auditors comply with the Government Auditing Standards.
One subset of an IG's assigned work is "to address and resolve specific allegations, complaints or information concerning possible violations of law, regulation
or policy." 122 Investigations "may involve a variety of matters, including allegations
of fraud with respect to grants and contracts, improprieties in the administration of
programs and operations, and serious allegations of employee misconduct." 12 3
These IG investigations typically include "nonprogrammatic analysis and instead

118. ROSENBERG, supra note 43, 104. Some OIGs, but not all, have separate offices devoted to
conducting program inspections and evaluations. Others fulfill this responsibility through their audit and
investigative offices. Where an OIG does conduct program evaluations and inspections, the IG is
charged with tracking and reporting these recommendations in its semiannual report to the Congress,
just as it reports its audit findings and recommendations. Former State Department IG Sherman Funk
once referred to "an inspection as an inch deep and a mile wide, compared to an audit, which is an inch
wide and a mile deep." Twenty Years After the Act, supra note 15 (testimony of Sherman M. Funk,
Inspector Gen., U.S. Dep't of Com. and U.S. Dep't of State).

119. S. Rep. No. 95-1071, at 30 (1978), as reprintedin 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2676, 2703-04; see also
STATUTORY INSPECTORS GENERAL, supra note 53 at 9 (audits, inspections, or evaluations include
"programmatic analysis, which may involve analyses related to the compliance, internal control, or
efficiency and effectiveness of agency programs and operations," as well as recommendations to
improve programs and operations).

120. 5 U.S.C. app. § 4(b)(1)(A) (2020). "For every finding that an IG office offers as a result of their
work, they must describe four things: (1) the condition they studied-typically because there was reason
to believe that the condition was undesirable; (2) the criteria they applied to assess how deviant the
condition was from the desired state, for example, as per a law or regulation; (3) the effect or potential
effect of the existing condition, such as undesirable outcomes; and (4) the cause, or the reason or factor
responsible for the difference between the current condition and the desired state." TRUTH TELLERS,
supra note 20 at 101.

121. 5 U.S.C. App. 3 § 4(c).
122. ROSENBERG, supra note 43, 104.

123.

Id.

2021]

CHALLENGES TO THE INDEPENDENCE OF INSPECTORS

GENERAL

229

focus primarily on alleged misuse or mismanagement of an agency's programs,
operations, or resources by an individual government employee, contractor, or
grantee."" The reports typically produce recommendations for improving the programs and operations under review.
Importantly, IGs are not to perform the work of their agencies. Congress gave
the first State Department IG the authority to suspend all or part of any project or
operation "with respect to which he has conducted or is conducting an inspection," but that power was never used and never again granted to any future IG.125
In fact, since then, Congress has specifically prohibited IGs from taking corrective action themselves. 12 The IG Act also prohibits the transfer of "program
operating responsibilities" to an IG.127 The rationale for these restrictions is that
"it would be difficult, if not impossible, for IGs to audit or investigate programs
and operations impartially and objectively if they were directly involved in making changes in them or carrying them out." 128 A certain amount of professional
detachment is inherent in the work of IGs, as "extensive background efforts and
deliberations are typically undertaken by [their] offices to prioritize [] work, collect relevant data, develop actionable recommendations, and then support actions
[undertaken] by agency staff to [implement any] recommended changes." 129
C. InspectorGeneralIndependence
Ensuring independent oversight by IGs was critical to the drafters of the IG
Act. The text of the Act makes clear that Congress intended IGs to be "independent and objective." 13 0 One survey of presidentially appointed and Senateconfirmed IGs reported that in their initial interactions with Congress, they were
asked to remain "independent of the agency and ...
[to] have a non-political
role." 131 Yet, there is no "standard definition" for what constitutes IG independence.132 One IG put it this way:

124. STATUTORY INSPECTORS GENERAL, supra note 53 at 9 ("Unlike audits and inspections or
evaluations, IG investigations can directly result in disciplinary actions that are criminal (e.g.,
convictions and indictments) or administrative (e.g., monetary payments, suspension/debarment, or
termination of employment).").
125. MONITORING GOVERNMENT, supra note 10, 29-30.
126. MONITORING GOVERNMENT, supra note 10 at 16-17 ("The IGs were neither created as line, or
operating, officers of their departments and agencies nor given any powers to suspend, or otherwise
interfere with, program activities.").

127. 5 U.S.C. app. §§ 8G(b), 9(a)(2) (2020).
128. FREDERICK M. KAISER,
GENERAL: PAST AND PRESENT 2

CONG. RSCH SERV., 98-379, STATUTORY OFFICES OF INSPECTOR

(2008).

129. TRUTH TELLERS, supra note 20 at 94.

130. 5 U.S.C. app. § 2(1).
131. How INSPECTORS GENERAL WORK, supra note 1 at 19; see also id. at p.20 ("[C]ongressional
staff interviewees expressly indicated that their (and presumably Congress) major concern involved
instances in which IGs are not sufficiently independent or aggressive, in which agencies ignore requests
for information, or in which agencies consistently do not implement OIG recommendations.
Accordingly, relations are positive for OIGs who are viewed as strongly independent of their host
agencies, keep their congressional contacts informed, and are responsive to congressional requests.").
132. STATUTORY INSPECTORS GENERAL, supra note 53 at 21.
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For an IG, independence is the coin of the realm. The GAO's yellow book
describes it as the State of mind that allows an individual to act with integrity
and exercise objectivity and professional skepticism. Professional skepticism
is an attitude that includes a questioning mind and a critical assessment of evidence, and in a nutshell, that is my job. I am a professional skeptic. I act as an
agent of positive change within the Department by having the freedom to be
independent and objective. I am here to ask the difficult questions, to challenge
the Department I work for to be better, to be more efficient, to ensure rigor in
Departmental operations, and to look for and eliminate waste.1 33

Even if not expressly defined, IG "independence" is plainly manifested in the
structure of the IG Act. First, Congress established the role of IG with protections
that distinguish it from other Executive appointees. The statute requires appoint'

ment "without regard to political affiliation,"" does not establish term limits, 3

and requires notice to Congress of the reasons for removal of an Inspector
General. 136 These are unprecedented and unparalleled protections intended to
insulate the position from Executive influence. The extraordinary procedural
requirements imposed on the removal of an IG speak to the importance of IG independence.137 Recent efforts in Congress to ensure the president provides specific reasons for removing an IG further underscore the extent to which the
independence of this particular role is held in unique regard.138
Second, IGs are obligated to keep Congress "fully and currently informed" of
"fraud and other serious problems, abuses, and deficiencies relating to the administration of programs and operations," "recommend corrective action," and

133. Improving the Efficiency, Effectiveness, and Independence of Inspectors General, Hearing
Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. and Governmental Aff., 114th Cong. 8 (2015) (testimony of John
Roth, Inspector Gen., Dep't of Homeland Sec.).

134. 5 U.S.C. app. § 3(a).
135. STATUTORY INSPECTORS GENERAL, supra note 53 at 13.

136. 5 U.S.C. app. § 3(b).
137.

COUNCIL OF THE INSPECTORS GEN. ON INTEGRITY AND EFFICIENCY, THE INSPECTORS GEN.

3

(2014). ("An establishment IG may be removed from office or transferred to another position within the
agency by the President; however, the President must communicate the reasons for the action in writing
to both Houses of Congress at least 30 days before the removal or transfer." "[A] DFE IG may be
removed from office or transferred to another position within the agency by the entity head; however,
the entity head must communicate the reasons for the action in writing to both Houses of Congress at
least 30 days before the removal or transfer. In a DFE agency with a board or commission, removal or
transfer of a DFE IG requires the written concurrence of two-thirds of the members of the board or
commission."); see also STATUTORY INSPECTORS GENERAL, supra note 53 at 12 (outlining removal
provisions).

138. Inspectors General Independence Act of 2020, S.3664, 1 1 6th Cong. (2020). Interestingly, the
bill that became the Inspector General Act did not require presidential notice of reasons for removal of
any IG but did require the Comptroller General to "promptly investigate and report to each House of
Congress on the circumstances of any such removal." H.R. Rep. No. 95-584, at 2 (1977). Another
provision considered, but dropped, would have given Inspectors General fixed terms. Hearing on H.R.

8558, supra note 48.
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"report on the progress made in implementing such corrective action."139 IGs do
not supervise or direct their host agencies; they report.14 0 Moreover, whenever an
IG issues a recommendation for corrective action to the agency, it must simultaneously submit the recommendation to Congress.14 1
As if to emphasize how different IGs are compared to other agencies or arms
of the government, the statute expressly imposes dual loyalties upon them. 14 2
Inspectors General are required by law to "keep the head [of their agency] and
the Congress" fully and currently informed. 143 The thrust of the dual reporting
provisions was to ensure the flow of information to Congress (viz., "keep ... fully
and currently informed", "recommend" and "report").14 4 After all, the most important asset Congress has in conducting effective oversight is access to quality,
timely, and unbiased information as to how federal agencies are performing.14 5 In
the lead-up to the Inspector General Empowerment Act of 2016,146 the notion of
"independence" was pointedly framed in terms of IG access to agency information.14' Congress believed that the independence of the IG hinged on the IG's
"access to key materials" and "timely information." 148

139. 5 U.S.C. app. §4(a)(5). See also QUALITY STANDARDS, supra note 90 at 35-39 (quality
standards for communicating results of OIG activities).
140. Indeed, when the IG Act was introduced, the Department of Justice raised concerns that the
statute would threaten separation of powers principles by effectively allowing the IG to "continu[ously]
supervis[e]" agency or departmental action. OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL, Opinion Letter on Inspector
General Legislation, 77-8 O.L.C. 17 (1977) (expressing concern about an IG's potential "assumption of
the Executive's role of administering or executing the laws").

141. 5 U.S.C. app. § 4(e).
142. See 5 U.S.C. app. § 2(3) (purpose and establishment of OIGs); id. § 4(a)(5) (duties and
responsibilities of OIGs). Both require the Inspector General to "keep the head of [the agency] and the
Congress fully and currently informed." Id. (emphasis added).

143. 5 U.S.C. app. § 4(a)(5) (emphasis supplied). The IG Act requires IGs to issue semiannual
reports that summarize the activities of their offices. Id. at § 5(a)(10). The report must be submitted by
the agency head unaltered to Congress within 30 days. Id. at § 5(b). IGs are required to immediately
report to their agency heads any "particularly serious or flagrant problems," and the head must transmit
the report unaltered to Congress within 7 days. Id. at §§ 5(d), 8G(g)(1) (establishment and DFE IGs); 50

U.S.C. § 3033(k)(2) (IG IC); and 50 U.S.C. § 3517(d)(2) (CIA IG). Authorizing statutes for the AOC,
LOC, and GPO IGs incorporate portions of Section 5 of the IG Act pertaining to the seven-day letter.

See 2 U.S.C. § 1808(d)(1) (AOC IG); 2 U.S.C. § 185(d)(1) (LOC IG); and 44 U.S.C. § 3903(a) (GPO
IG).
144. ROSENBERG, supra note 43, 107 ("Transparency is a key attribute of the IG scheme.").

145. See David Epstein & Sharyn O'Halloran, A Theory of Strategic Oversight: Congress, Lobbyists,
and the Bureaucracy, 11 J. OF L., ECON., & ORG. 227, 246-47 (1995) ("Congress delegates authority to
avail itself of bureaucratic expertise. But legislators worry that agencies will use their informational
advantage strategically, enacting policies different from those that Congress would prefer were it fully
informed.").

146. Pub. L. No. 114-317, §§ 2, 3, 4(c)-6, 7(b)(1), (c), (d)(2)-(3), 130 Stat. 1595-1606 (2016).
147. See supra note 48 and accompanying text (controversy regarding access to Department of
Justice documents and other information withheld from other Inspectors General).
148. Access to Justice?: Does DOJ's Office of Inspector General Have Access to Information
Needed to Conduct Proper Oversight? Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary 113th Cong. 1-2
(2014) (statement of Rep. Goodlatte, Chairman, H. Comm. on the Judiciary); see also supra note 61
(statement of Michael Horowitz, Inspector Gen., Dep't of Justice) ("[R]equiring the OIG to obtain
permission from department leadership seriously compromises our independence. The OIG should be
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The independence of the IG office from the Executive Branch is reinforced in
several other provisions of the IG Act. 149 For example, the statute requires operational independence with respect to IG audits and investigations. `0 In the larger
establishments, IG independence is reinforced through protection of their budgets1 5 1 and separate appropriations accounts.1 5 2 With limited exceptions, host
agencies are forbidden from interfering with IG activities and operations.1 53 OIGs
have discretion to set their priorities without outside direction, unless a review is
ordered by Congress.15 4
The strict statutory boundaries and limits on the scope of IG activity also reflect
Congress's intent that the IG maintain independence in the performance of her
duties. The House Report accompanying the original legislation made clear that
IGs would not have responsibility for agency programs and operations but focus
instead on oversight of them.1 5 5 Inspectors General were created to be "independent and have no program responsibilities to divide allegiances.'' 156 In describing

deciding which documents it needs access to, not the leadership of the agency that is being overseen.").
"We certainly want to make sure that the Offices of Inspector General remain independent, [and] that
you have full access to the information that is required ... " said Homeland Security Committee Chair
Ron Johnson. Improving the Efficiency, Effectiveness, and Independence of Inspectors General, supra
note 133, at 2 (statement of Sen. Johnson, Chairman, S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. and Governmental
Aff.). "Delaying access [to agency information] imperils an IGs independence ... " testified Department
of Justice Inspector General Michael Horowitz." Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies
Appropriations for 2016: Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the H. Comm. on Appropriations, 114th Cong.
62 (2015) (testimony of Michael Horowitz, Inspector Gen., Dep't of Justice); see also Improving the
Efficiency, Effectiveness, and Independence of Inspectors General, Hearing Before the S. Comm. on
Homeland Sec. and Governmental Aff., 114th Cong. 4 (2015) (testimony of Michael Horowitz, Inspector
Gen., Dep't of Justice) ("Delaying or denying access imperils an IG's independence, impedes our ability
to provide effective and independent oversight....").
149. See generally 5 U.S.C. app. §§ 6(a)(7), 3(b), (g); see also FREDERICK M. KAISER, CONG. RSCH
SERV., 98-379, STATUTORY OFFICES OF INSPECTOR GENERAL: PAST AND PRESENT 2 (2008); ROSENBERG,

supra note 43, 106 (detailing "elements of OIG independence").

150. 5 U.S.C. app. §§ 3, 8G(d). Although the IG reports to the agency head, even that official may
not compromise the initiation or conduct of an OIG audit or investigation.
151. See STATUTORY INSPECTORS GENERAL, supra note 53, at 13 (The process "arguably provides a
level of budgetary independence . . . by enabling Congress to perceive differences between the
budgetary perspectives of IGs and affiliated agencies or the President.").

152. See 31 U.S.C. § 1105(a)(25); 50 U.S.C. § 3517(f)(1) (CIA IG); 50 U.S.C. § 3033(m) (IC IG);
see also STATUTORY INSPECTORS GENERAL, supra note 53, at 14.
153. 5 U.S.C. app. § 6(a)(2) (IG given full discretion to undertake those investigations that are, in the
judgment of the IG, "necessary or desirable.")

154. Id.
155. H.R. REP. No. 95-584 at 12-13 (1977). IG independence is fostered by their "lack of conflicting
policy responsibility." Inspector Gen. Authority to Conduct Regulatory Investigations, 13 O.L.C. 54, 59

(1989). See also S. Rep. No. 95-1071 at 27 (1978), as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2676, 2702 ("The
Inspector . . . General's focus is the way in which Federal tax dollars are spent by the agency....")

(emphasis added).
156. 124 CONG. REC. 10,405 (1978) (statement of Rep. Levitas); see also 124 Cong. Record 10,404
(1978) (statement of Rep. Horton) ("[T]his new Office of Inspector General will have absolutely no
policy responsibility. The new IGs are to be totally independent and free from political pressure.");
TRUTH TELLERS, supra note 20, at 121 ("Unique among federal executive officials, on a daily basis IGs
face the challenge of maintaining independence and being accountable, both while being constructive,
collaborative, or even cooperative to advance their home agency's mission and to fulfill expectations of
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the IG's mandate, the lead Senate sponsor of the legislation said that "independence" was "most important," exemplified by a "special reporting relationship to
the Congress."157
The legislative history of the IG Act of 1978 does not provide much guidance
for discerning what constitutes "program operating responsibilities." However,
the testimony of the Comptroller of the Department of Labor, Al Zuck, is instructive.158 Mr. Zuck objected to establishing an Office of Inspector General inside
agencies themselves on the basis that an "independent" entity tasked with oversight would diminish the incentive of the agency to perform its work well. 159 At
that time, audit activities were centralized in the Department of Labor's
"Directorate of Audit and Investigations," separate from those performing the
work but inside the agency and reporting up to the Secretary. 160 Mr. Zuck argued
that an independent IG would interfere with the Secretary's "flexibility" to determine the best manner to reduce fraud and abuse. 161 He specifically argued that
"current arrangements provide[d] independence' 16 2 and that the "accountability"
function, such as audits and investigations, are integral to "program operating

the relevant congressional committees."). This followed the model Congress established for the
Inspector General for the Department of Health, Education and Welfare. See H.R. REP. No. 94-1573, at
1 (1976) (H.R. 15390 established the new office of Inspector General inside the Department of Health,
Education and Welfare "with no program responsibilities" to conduct and supervise audits and
investigations "relating to programs and operations of the Department."); id. at 2 (the office would
"provide a means for keeping the Secretary and the Congress "fully and currently informed"); id. at 3
("no program operating responsibilities" would be transferred); id. at 3 ("HEW administers around 300
separate programs"); id. ("fraud and abuse [occurs] in HEW programs"); id. at 4 (independence is
jeopardized when officials "report to and [are] hired and fired by officials directly responsible for ...
programs"); id. at 5 (Inspector General should have "no program responsibilities"); id. at 6 (to "promote
objectivity and prevent possible conflicts of interest, no program operating responsibilities [would] be
assigned" to the new Inspector General); id. at 10 (transfer of "program operating responsibilities"
prohibited); see also S. REP. No. 94-1324, at 3 (the new HEW Inspector General "would have no
program responsibilities"); id. at 5 (audit and investigation assets would be transferred to the new IG but
"no program operating responsibilities [would] be . . . transferred."); id. at 8 (to "insure that the
independence and objectivity of the [IG] is not compromised, transfer of program operating
responsibilities [is] prohibited."); id. at 13-14 (prohibition on transfer of "program operating
responsibilities").
157. supra note 53, statement of Sen. Eagleton. The drafters of the IG Act were concerned about IGs
"working side by side" with the programmatic agencies that they have responsibility for inspecting
because it "blur[s] the necessary independence." Hearing on H.R. 8558, supra note 48 (statement of
Rep. Elliott H. Levitas); see also id. at 15 (statement of Sen. Eagleton) ("[I]t is crucial to insure ...
independence" from the agency.).
158. See Hearingson H.R. 2819, supra note 59 (statement of Al Zuck, Comptroller, Dep't of Labor).
Chairman Fountain indicated that he "found the same theme running throughout all ... the agencies"
while testifying on the legislation. Id. Hearingson H.R. 2819, supra note 59 at 165 (statement of Rep. L.
H. Fountain, Chairman, Subcomm. on Intergovernmental Relations & Human Res. of the H. Comm. on
Gov't Operations); see also U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO/AFMD-89-68, INSPECTORS
GENERAL: ADEQUACY OF TVA's INSPECTOR GENERAL 9 (1989).
159. See Hearingson H.R. 2819, supranote 59 (statement of Al Zuck, Comptroller, Dep't of Labor).
160. Id. Id. Id. See Hearingson H.R. 2819, supra note 59 (statement of Al Zuck, Comptroller, Dep't
of Labor).

161. Id. at 163.
162. Id. at 164.
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responsibility," not separate from it. They also, he argued, effectively incentivize
agency staff to detect and deter waste, fraud, and abuse. 163 Chairman Fountain
responded that Congress expected agencies to act responsibly with taxpayer
funds, even if the IG served as an additional safeguard." Chairman Fountain
also questioned whether it would be possible to have "maximum independence
and objectivity when auditors or investigators report to the persons who are also
responsible for running the programs being audited or investigated." 165 Indeed,
GAO recently reiterated this point by expressing concern about the "independence implications" where an acting IG holds a position as a "senior employee" or
presidentially appointed and Senate-confirmed official at the host agency or even
another agency. 166
Lack of independence, whether perceived or actual, is antithetical to the factors
that motivated and informed the IG Act. Dependence on or collaboration with the
agency threatens an IG's credibility and its relationship with Congress. On at
least one occasion, apparent lack of independence has led to public condemnation
of an IG by CIGIE. 167 CIGIE's quality standards reinforce the importance of IG
independence. 168 They provide that IGs and their staffs have a responsibility to
maintain independence "both in fact and appearance." 16 9 That independence is
protected by a "legislative safety net," viz. their unique reporting relationship to

163. Id. at 167.
164. Id. at 167; see supra note 59 and accompanying text.
165. Hearings on H.R. 2819 at 166; see also Establishment of an Office of Inspector Gen. in the Dep't
of Health, Educ. & Welfare: Hearing on H.R. 5302 et. al. Before the Subcomm. on Intergovernmental
Relations & Human Res. of the H. Comm. on Gov't Operations,94th Cong. 44 (1976) (statement of Tom
Morris, Inspector Gen., Dep't of Health, Educ., & Welfare) ("[W]hat is the proper relationship of the
Inspector General to program and policy issues? [The bill] prescribe[s] that we will not be involved....");

H.R. REP. No. 94-1573 at 13 (1976) ("Personnel [auditing and investigating fraud at HEW] lack
independence ... because they report to officials who are directly responsible for managing the programs
the unit is investigating."); see generally H.R. REP. No. 100-771 (1988) (supporting this interpretation
through describing the provisions of the proposed bill (to be codified as section 8E of the Act), which
extended the Inspector General concept to 33 other federal entities, as requiring "that multiple audit and
investigative units in an agency (exceptfor units carryingout audits or investigations as an integralpart of
the program of the agency) be consolidated into a single Office of Inspector General ... who would report
directly to the agency head and to the Congress."); Inspector Gen. Auth. to Conduct Regulatory
Investigations, 13 O.L.C. 54, 65 (1989) (stating that these newly-created "inspectors general would have
the same authorities and responsibilities as those provided in the 1978 act); H.R. REP. No. 94-1573 at 15. It
is also significant that a provision in the Senate bill that would have transferred to the newly-created Office
of the Inspector General at the Nuclear Regulatory Commission the office that conducted the
Commission's regulatory investigations was dropped after objections were raised by several Senators.
166.

U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO

CONSIDERATIONS FOR REFORM 5

(2020)

20-639R,

INSPECTORS GEN.: INDEP. PRINCIPLES AND

[hereinafter PRINCIPLES AND CONSIDERATIONS].

167. Letter from James H. Burrus, Chair, CIGIE Integrity Committee, to Clay Johnson, CIGIE

Chair, dated Jan. 22, 2007 at 4, available at https://www.govexec.com/pdfs/PCIEReportonNASAIG.pdf
(reporting that the NASA Inspector General "sought to develop and maintain a close relationship with
[the] former NASA Administrator [which] contributed to an appearance that his independence was
being compromised.").
168. QUALITY STANDARDS, supra note 90, at 12-13.

169. Id. at 10.
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Congress. 170 In outlining their approach to preserving independence, the CIGIE
standards specify the importance of identifying threats, evaluating their significance, and applying safeguards to eliminate or reduce threats to an acceptable
level. 171 Threats include excessive familiarity with agency management or personnel and taking on or performing agency management functions. 1 72
II.

PARALLEL ENFORCEMENT

Parallel enforcement violates the letter and spirit of the IG Act by improperly
entangling IGs with the agencies they oversee. "Parallel enforcement" is the
expansion of the IG's role and duties beyond audits and investigations of the
agencies they oversee-whether authorized by Act of Congress or merely as a
result of expansive interpretation by IGs of their statutory roles-to activities that
entangle the IG with the agencies they oversee. Although IGs are forbidden from
engaging in "program operating responsibilities," 173 the line between prohibited
activity and otherwise acceptable enforcement activity is blurry. To draw the
line, IGs must frequently make judgment calls that may end up putting OIG staff
into what should exclusively be the host agency's lane. Often, Congress itself has
authorized or permitted IG expansion into activities that overlap substantially
with the function of the host agency. This further undermines IG independence.
Entanglement between IGs and the agencies they oversee compromises independence and creates the potential for confusion within the agency, among members of the press and public, and potentially among whistleblowers. Such
entanglement thereby impinges upon the IG's ability to serve as an instrument of
Congressional oversight. 17 4

A. Defining ParallelEnforcement
Congress did not originally intend Inspectors General to undertake the activities that their host agencies perform. That much is clear in the language of the
1978 Act, which prohibits the transfer of "program operating responsibilities" to
the newly established OIGs. 175 With this provision, "Congress intended to insulate IGs from responsibility for running the very programs that they might
review." 176 In 1989, the Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel (OLC)
concluded as much in addressing a challenge to the Department of Labor
Inspector General's desire to conduct certain investigations. 177 OLC reasoned

170. Id. at 12. Id. at 12. Id. at 12. QUALITY STANDARDS, supra note 90, at 12.
171. Id. at 12. Id. at 12. Id. at 12. QUALITY STANDARDS, supra note 90, at 12.
172. QUALITY STANDARDS, supra note 90, at 13-15.

173. 5 U.S.C. app.

§§

8G(b), 9(a)(2).

174. See infra. Sec. II.B (outlining OIG parallel enforcement activities).

175. 5 U.S.C. app. §§ 8G(b), 9(a)(2).
176. COUNCIL OF THE INSPECTORS GEN.
(2014).

ON INTEGRITY AND EFFICIENCY, THE INSPECTORS GEN. 11

177. See Inspector Gen. Authority to Conduct Regulatory Investigations, 13 O.L.C. 54 (1989)
(concluding that the IG Act) did not generally vest authority in IGs to conduct investigations pursuant to
regulatory statutes administered by their host agencies or permit their subsequent transfer to IGs).
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that the agency is "charged with administering" its enabling statute, which
includes grants of enforcement and investigative authority, but IGs do not have
authority to conduct investigations "relating to" agency programs based on "the
structure and legislative history of the Act." 178 The drafters of the 1978 Act
expressly disclaimed IG responsibility to enforce agency statutes. 179 The "investigatory portion" of an agency's "regulatory policy," they concluded, belongs with
officials "designated by statute or by the Secretary"-not with an official "separate from the regulatory division" of the agency or department. 180 OLC concluded
that Congress did not intend to change the fundamental regulatory structure of
the federal government by creating IGs.
By not partaking in the functions and responsibilities of their agencies, IGs are
supposed to abjure any "vested interest in agency policies or particular programs
and can remain unbiased in their review of those programs." 181 But there is no
definition in the statute or legislative history of "program operating responsibilities.'"182 Inspectors General-at their discretion-may interpret the provision to
mean that Congress "intended to insulate IGs from responsibility for running the
very programs that they might review [and therefore avoid] vested interest in
agency policies or particular programs [so as to] remain unbiased. ... '183 Courts
have also been relatively permissive in construing the boundaries of Inspector
General activity. 184 In addition to what Congress or their host agency assigns

178. Id. at58.
179. Id. at 59-60 (statement of Rep. Levitas) (asserting that IGs should not be "a new layer of
bureaucracy to plague the public.").
180. Id. at 60; see also id. at 61 ("One of the Inspector General's functions is to criticize regulatory
investigative policy, a function he cannot perform if it is his responsibility to set and implement that

policy.").
181.

COUNCIL OF THE INSPECTORS GEN. ON INTEGRITY AND EFFICIENCY, THE INSPECTORS GEN. 11

(2014).
182. See supra note 156 and accompanying text (strict statutory boundaries and limits on the scope
of IG activity reflect Congress's intention that the IG maintain independence in the performance of its
duties); see also infra note 184 and accompanying text (courts have been relatively permissive in
construing the boundaries of IG activity).
183. Id.; see also FREDERICK M. KAISER, CONG. RSCH SERV., 98-379, STATUTORY OFFICES OF
INSPECTOR GEN.: ESTABLISHMENT AND EVOLUTION 2 (2003).

184. See, e.g., Univ. ofMed. & Dentistry ofN.J. v. Corrigan,347 F.3d 57, 66 (3d Cir. 2003) (holding
that the inspector general's mandate to prevent and detect fraud and abuse is not limited by HHS's-or its
agents'-own efforts to prevent and detect fraud and abuse."); United States v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 186

F.3d 644, 648 (5th Cir. 1999) (finding that subpoenas that did not "displace any agency responsibilities"
permissible because no agency functions had been "transferred to the IG."); Inspector Gen. of the U.S.

Dep't of Agric. v. Glenn, 122 F.3d 1007, 1011 (11th Cir. 1997) ("While we agree that the [Inspector
General Act]'s main function is to detect abuse within agencies themselves, the [Act's] legislative
history indicates that Inspectors General are permitted and expected to investigate public involvement

with the programs in certain situations."); Winters Ranch P'shipv. Viadero, 123 F.3d 327, 334 (5th Cir.
1997) ("No transfer of operating responsibility occurs and the IG's independence and objectivity is not
compromised when the IG mimics or adapts agency investigatory methods or functions in the course of
an independent audit or investigation."); id. at 327 (upholding IG's subpoena because it was part of an
investigation to test the effectiveness of the agency's conduct of a program and not part of program

operating responsibilities). But see Univ. of Med. & Dentistry of N.J. v. Corrigan, 347 F.3d 57, 66 (3d
Cir. 2003) ("If the department fails to perform a function that is within its responsibilities, and the
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them, IGs are basically free to render whatever assistance to their host agencies
they see fit-within the bounds of their judgment and the constraints of
Congressional supervision.
Inspectors General may - but do not always - implement the prohibition on
undertaking "program operating responsibilities" in two ways. First, the "culture"
of IGs emphasizes the need for "balance." Foremost is the need for IGs to balance independence in the form of accountability to Congress and collaborative engagement
with their host agency. 185 IGs operationalize this balance primarily by separating the
audit function from other functions inside their offices. 186 Independence is a challenge
because distance from the agency makes it harder to obtain needed information. 187
Staff engaged in auditing and in evaluation and inspection nevertheless report to the
same ultimate official, viz. the IG. Second, IGs may avoid becoming part of agency
policymaking, whether that means avoiding agency leadership meetings and policy
discussions or eschewing a public identity of interest with agency management.1 88
Clearly, IGs are not supposed to deliver or manage the services, benefits, and
programs of their host agencies. Their core responsibilities are auditing agency
activities, investigating allegations of fraud and abuse by the agency, and keeping
Congress informed. But over time, as they have proven their value to Congress
and as the political culture has become more "dedicated to improving management,'189 they have received more resources and flexibility to undertake more
activities cooperatively with their host agencies. 190 As IGs inherited new

inspector general takes on those responsibilities, then it may be correct to speak of "transfer" of program
operating responsibilities."); Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Office of Inspector Gen., R.R. Retirement Bd.,
983 F.2d 631 (5th Cir. 1993) (finding impermissible transfer of authority where the inspector general
audited railroad employers for tax compliance when the board had declined to do so).
185. TRUTH TELLERS, supra note 20 at 122-23.
186. See Government Accountability Office, GOVERNMENT AUDITING STANDARDS 2018 at 29
(GAO-18-568G) ("In all matters relating to the GAGAS engagement, auditors and audit organizations
must be independent from an audited entity.")
187. TRUTH TELLERS, supra note 20, at 128; see also id. at 129 (stating that cooperation is "key to
the IG's work").
188. TRUTH TELLERS, supra note 20, at 141.
189. Twenty Years After the Act, supra note 15, (statement of Sen. John Glenn).
190. Law enforcement authority was not included in the 1978 Act. Over time, the argument was made that
IGs could not perform their jobs without such authorities. See, e.g., Twenty Years After the Act, supra note 15
(statement of Former Department of Commerce and State Department Inspector General Sherman M. Funk)
(arguing for "gun and badge" authority). The Homeland Security Act of 2002 extended law enforement
powers to criminal investigators in offices headed by presidential appointees. See Pub. L. 107-296, § 812,
(codified at 5 U.S.C. app § 6(f)). The IG Act as amended now authorizes criminal investigators in the offices of
Presidentially-appointed IGs to exemise law enforcement powers while conducting official duties. IG Act, § 6
(e). See Council of Inspectors Gen., "The Inspectors Gen.," (July 14, 2014) https://www.ignet.gov/sites/default/

files/files/IG_Authorities_Paper_-_Final_6-11-14.pdf, [https://perma.cc/8W8S-C9S9]. These law enforcement
powers include the authority to (1) carry a firearm while engaged in official duties; (2) make an arrest without a
warrant for any Federal offense committed in the presence of the agent, or when the agent has reasonable
gmunds to believe that the person to be arrested has committed or is committing a Federal felony; and (3) seek
and execute Federal warrants for arrest, search of premises, or seizure of evidence under the authority of the
United States. Id. The Act also provides a mechanism whereby the Attorney General may, after an initial
determination of need, confer law enforcement powers on investigative personnel of other OIGs, including
those in DFE OIGs. Id. See also id. at 16 (Appendix 3) (listing OIGs with law enforcement authorities).
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responsibilities and missions, they gradually became an integral part of solving
management problems. They tackled problems as frequently as they sounded the
alarm, functioning as "both watchdog and junkyard dog," in the words of former
Senator John Glenn. 191 They obtained law enforcement authority to assist them in
carrying out their duties. 192 While the Inspector General Act and its prohibition
on the assumption of "program operating responsibilities" has remained in
force and effect, the reality is that IGs do many things that, to the outside
world, might appear to cross the line from cooperation to policy implementation. The reasons for such activity may include congressional authorization,
policy determinations by the IG, patterns and practice of cooperation at the
agency, or other factors. 193 Over time, IG independence has eroded as their
responsibilities have expanded. 194 As a result, Congress is less likely to
receive the benefit of independent information.
According to CIGIE, the statutory prohibition on the IGs having program operating responsibilities "does not preclude the IG from assisting the agency and its
committees and project teams, when the IG determines that such assistance will
help the entity reduce fraud, waste, and abuse and such assistance by the IG
would not compromise its independence in subsequent reviews of the subject
matter." 195 The goal, of course, is for the IG to "remain objective if he or she later

191. Twenty Years After the Act, supra note 15 (statement of Sen. John Glenn).

192. Pub. L. No. 107-296,

§ 812

(codified at 5 U.S.C. app.

§ 6(f)).

193. The Eleventh Circuit's reasoning about the expansion of IG operations is illustrative:
While we agree that IGA's main function is to detect abuse within agencies themselves, the
[Inspector General Act's] legislative history indicates that Inspectors General are permitted and
expected to investigate public involvement with the programs in certain situations. Congressman
Levitas, a co-sponsor of the IGA, stated that the Inspector General's "public contact would only be
for the beneficial and needed purpose of receiving complaints about problems with agency administration and in the investigation of fraud and abuse by those persons who are misusing or stealing
taxpayer dollars." 124 Cong. Rec. 10,405 (1978). From this statement, we conclude that the
Inspector General's public contact in this case was appropriate because it occurred during the
course of an investigation into alleged misuse of taxpayer dollars.

Inspector Gen. of U.S. Dep't of Agric. v. Glenn, 122 F.3d 1007, 1011 (11th Cir. 1997) (concluding that
&

subpoenas issued by the Agriculture Department Inspector General to members of the public did not
exceed the statutory authority granted under the Inspector General Act); see also William S. Fields
Thomas E. Robinson, Legal and FunctionalInfluences on the Objectivity of the Inspector Gen. Audit

Process, 2 Geo. Mason Indep. L. Rev. 97, 109-10 (1993) (arguing that the 1978 IG Act's consolidation
of existing audit and investigative units, along with their "functions, powers or duties," into the Offices
of Inspector General compromised IG independence and objectivity from the start).
194. See William S. Fields & Thomas E. Robinson, Legal and Functional Influences on the

Objectivity of the Inspector Gen. Audit Process, 2 GEO. MASON INDEP. L. REV. 97, 110 (1993) (citing a
series of examples, including annual appropriations containing directives to audit specific programs,
requirements that an agency's IG perform an audit, and laws such as the Single Audit Act and the Chief
Financial Officers Act).
195.

COUNCIL OF THE INSPECTORS GEN. ON INTEGRITY AND EFFICIENCY, THE INSPECTORS GEN. 11

(2014) ("For example, an IG may decline to serve as a voting member on a policy-making board or
committee within the agency; however, the IG could opt to attend those meetings and provide technical
assistance with respect to fraud, waste, and abuse issues or matters of economy, efficiency, or
effectiveness.").
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reviews those issues and matters." 196 But this leads to difficult line drawing.
Department of Justice Inspector General Michael Horowitz objected in 2014 to
"compromising" his independence by "hav[ing] to go to the people I oversee for
approval to get records." 197 Sharing enforcement duties with the "people [an IG]
oversee[s]" to make policy or implement agency programs or operations is arguably even more "compromising."
In the end, any entanglement is subject to the IG's discretion. "[T]he manner in
which each IG interprets and implements [their] authorities and responsibilities
can vary widely, thus potentially resulting in substantially different structures,
operations, and activities across IGs." 198 As the saying goes, "if you've seen one
IG, you've seen one IG." 199 There are no standards and certainly no reference to
the important principle of independence constraining IG discretion. CIGIE's
standards for quality warn against excessive familiarity with management or personnel or performing management functions. 200 But these are not binding or enforceable. GAO has urged greater attention to independence in IG reform efforts,
building on CIGIE's standards that IGs comply with Generally Accepted
Government Auditing Standards for their audits. 2 1 These standards require structural separation of the audit organization and the application of an independence
"framework" in assessing threats to independence, but they ultimately rely on the
judgment of the Inspector General. 2 2 The threats to independence outlined in
GAGAS are compounded by IG entanglement with agency activities.203 At the
same time, there are incentives to interpret the ban on programmatic responsibilities loosely, beginning with the trend towards more operational flexibility on the
part of IGs, the grant of enforcement authority, and the reliance on IG staff for
management and performance evaluation. This creates a problem.
There is a strong imperative for IGs to work collaboratively with their agencies, which is to be commended for the sake of efficiency and effectiveness. 20 4

196.

COUNCIL OF THE INSPECTORS GEN. ON INTEGRITY AND EFFICIENCY, THE INSPECTORS GEN. 11

(2014).
197. Obstructing
Oversight and Gov't
Dep't of Justice).
198. CONG. RSCH
199. Peter Tyler,

Oversight: Concerns From Inspectors Gen., Hearing Before the H. Comm. on
Reform, 113th Cong. 41 (2014) (statement of Michael Horowitz, Inspector Gen.
SERV., R45450, STATUTORY INSPECTORS GENERAL supra note 53.
Remarks at Wayne State University Law School Conference (June 13, 2018),

https://archive.org/details/CSPAN3_20180614_015200_Role_of_Inspectors_GeneralEffectiveness/
start/2457.3/end/2468.4, archived at https://perma.cc/PUP3-X5UC.
200. QUALITY STANDARDS, supra note 90 at 13-15.
201. PRINCIPLES AND CONSIDERATIONS, supra note 166 (referencing the GAO), https://www.gao.

gov/yellowbook/overview [https://perma.cc/A722-RG4F]; see also Pub. L. No. 115-91, div. A, title
XV, §1521(e), 131 Stat. 1714, (2017) (providing that the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan
Reconstruction comply with GAGAS in all its reporting).
202. PRINCIPLES AND CONSIDERATIONS, supra note 166 at 3 ("citing the evaluative framework").
203. Id. at 6 (citing the types of threats to consider in including the undue influence threat and
management participation threat).
204. See LACK ESSENTIAL TOOLS, supra note 17 at 11 (citing Memorandum from Alice Rivlin,
Deputy Dir., Exec. Off. of the President, Inspector General Vision Statement, (Apr. 11, 1994)
(encouraging IGs to work collaboratively with their agencies)).
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But as longtime observers point out, "[w]hile a relationship between agency and
IG of pure antagonism surely is not desirable, there are dangers associated with
IGs being too closely identified with agency success." 205 Most importantly, it
risks involving the IG in programmatic responsibilities of the agency. Even when
an OIG engages in its own program operating activity independently from the
agency, by working as an enforcement arm against the public, the OIG is in practice no longer independent of the agency.
B. ParallelEnforcement by InspectorsGeneral Is Pervasive across the Federal

Government
IGs do many things that might appear to cross the line from cooperation to policy implementation. The reasons for such activities may include congressional
authorization, policy determinations by the IG, patterns and practice of cooperation at the agency, or other factors. Although IGs are forbidden from engaging in
"program operating responsibilities," 206 the term itself is undefined, and the
blurred line between oversight; fighting waste, fraud and abuse; and improving
program management frequently requires IGs to make judgment calls. Some IGs
have had their roles expanded by Congress, while others have voluntarily taken
on activities cooperatively with their host agencies. Participating in-and sometimes, spearheading-enforcement actions against the public is not a function
that serves Congressional oversight of the Executive Branch. The consequences
of this entanglement include compromising the independence and the benefit IGs
were intended to provide. This section offers ten examples of IGs carrying out
enforcement activities that extend beyond oversight responsibilities. These "parallel enforcement" initiatives can and frequently do contribute to host agency
objectives. But serving as a host agency "cop" does not further the Congressional
interest in independent oversight. The following section analyzes the problems
that flow from these types of activities.
1. Health & Human Services
The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) was created as the
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW). 20 7 The department's mission is to provide effective health and human services to "enhance the health and

205. LACK ESSENTIAL TOOLS, supra note 17 at 11 ("Agency leaders should ... be careful not to
over-emphasize that IGs are part of an agency's success, because this attitude could be construed as
tipping the balance from independence to subordination.").
206. 5 U.S.C. app. §§ 8G(b), 9(a)(2).
207. See 5 U.S.C. app. The Department of Education Act of 1979 created a separate Department of
Education. See The Department of Education Organization Act, 20 U.S.C. § 3411 (1979). The
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare became the Department of Health and Human Services
in 1980. See U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., HHS Historical Highlights, https://www.hhs.

gov/about/historical-highlights/index.html,
November 5, 2020).

archived at https://perma.cc/UMZ5-K774

(last visited
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well-being of all Americans.'' 2 8 The HEW OIG was the first modern statutory IG
Office. 209 The IG expends especially significant effort investigating fraud by
recipients of government funds, as these programs are particularly susceptible to
fraud due to their size and complexity. 210
The HHS-OIG manages investigations into suspected wrongdoing related to
the Health Care Fraud and Abuse Control Program (HCFAC) and is authorized to
penalize wrongdoers. 21 1 HCFAC addresses fraud committed against all health
plans and expends funds to the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services
(CMS), the Children's Health Insurance Program (CHIP), and HHS OIG. 212 The
HHS Secretary "acting through the Department's Inspector General (HHS/

OIG)" directs HCFAC alongside the Attorney General of the DOJ.213 In practice,
the HHS-OIG is responsible for conducting and coordinating investigations of
suspected fraud in HCFAC programs. 21 4 The CMS, for example, usually refers
suspected fraud to the HHS-OIG. 215 Due to its vital role in HCFAC, Congress
appropriates a large portion of HCFAC funds directly to the HHS-OIG. 216
As part of HCFAC, OIG investigators participate in inter-agency programs 217
designed to weed out cases of fraud and abuse. For instance, the Medicare Fraud

208. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., About HHS, HHS.GOV, https://www.performance.
gov/health-and-human-services/, archived at https://perma.cc/E3NJ-4KN6 (last visited July 20, 2020).
209. Utah Shriners' Hospital for Crippled Children Land Conveyance and Department of Health,
Education and Welfare Office of Inspector General Establishment, Pub. L. No. 94-505, §401 201(3)
(1976401(h); see also STATUTORY INSPECTORS GENERAL, supra note 53 at 1.
210.

See U.S. GOv'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF.,

GAO-18-660T,

MEDICARE:

ACTIONS NEEDED TO

BETTER MANAGE FRAUD RISKS 1-3 (2018).
211.

U.S. GOv'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-12-820, HEALTH CARE FRAUD: TYPES OF PROVIDERS

INVOLVED IN MEDICARE, MEDICAID, AND THE CHILDREN'S HEALTH INSURANCE PROGRAM CASES 6-12

(2012). The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) established HCFAC.
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, tit. II, § 201, 110
Stat. 1936, 1937 (1996) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320a-7c, (2011), 1395i(k) (2010)); see also U.S.
GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-13-746, HEALTH CARE FRAUD AND ABUSE PROGRAM: INDICATORS
PROVIDE INFORMATION ON PROGRAM ACCOMPLISHMENTS, BUT ASSESSING PROGRAM EFFECTIVENESS IS

DIFFICULT 1-2 (2013).
212.

U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-13-746, HEALTH CARE FRAUD AND ABUSE PROGRAM:

INDICATORS

PROVIDE INFORMATION

ON

PROGRAM

ACCOMPLISHMENTS,

BUT

ASSESSING PROGRAM

EFFECTIVENESS IS DIFFICULT 1-2 (2013).
213.

U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERV. & U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, HEALTH CARE FRAUD AND

ABUSE CONTROL PROGRAM ANNUAL REPORT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2019 1 (2020).
214.

See U.S. GOV'T

ACCOUNTABILITY OFF.,

GAO-12-820,

HEALTH CARE FRAUD:

TYPES

OF

PROVIDERS INVOLVED IN MEDICARE, MEDICAID, AND THE CHILDREN'S HEALTH INSURANCE PROGRAM

CASES 7-8 (2012).

215. Id. at 8 (2012).
216.

Id. see U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-13-746, HEALTH CARE FRAUD AND ABUSE

PROGRAM:

INDICATORS

PROVIDE INFORMATION

ON PROGRAM

ACCOMPLISHMENTS,

BUT ASSESSING

PROGRAM EFFECTIVENESS IS DIFFICULT 10-12 (2013) (explaining the various activities conducted by the

HHS-OIG and the DOJ under the HCFAC program).
217. Congress encourages coordination between agencies and departments through legislation such
as the Government Performance and Results Act Modernization Act (GPRAMA) and its predecessor,
the Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA). Congress hoped that these legislative efforts
would enable agencies to address cross-cutting issues efficiently and effectively. See GPRA

Modernization Act, Pub. L. No. 111-352, 124 Stat. 3866 (2011) (codified at 5 U.S.C.

§§

306, 5105; 31
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Strike Force Teams unite the efforts and resources of multiple agencies under the
common goal of identifying health care fraud and swiftly bringing prosecutions. 218
HHS-OIG, CMS, and DOJ agents use data analytics to identify, investigate, and prosecute fraud. 219 The GAO designates Medicare as a "High-Risk" issue "because [of] its
complexity and susceptibility to improper payments, in addition to its size. ."..220
Efforts such as the Medicare Fraud Strike Force Teams have proven to be efficient in
combating fraud. One such strike force team was involved in the investigation of the
largest healthcare fraud scheme ever charged by the Department of Justice in 2019,
leading to the defendant's twenty-year sentence.2 21
In October 2018, the DOJ announced the creation of a similar initiative to combat the opioid epidemic. 222 The Appalachian Regional Prescription Opioid
(ARPO) Strike Force focuses specifically on investigating cases involving physicians and pharmacies that are responsible for medically unnecessary opioid prescriptions paid for by Medicare and Medicaid. 223 The HHS OIG's Office of
Investigation works closely with law enforcement partners in the DEA, FBI,
Medicaid Fraud Control Units, and other agencies in these efforts. 224 In April
2019, the ARPO Strike Force participated in the largest ever prescription opioid
law enforcement operation, the Appalachian Regional Prescription Opioid Surge
Takedown. This takedown resulted in charges against sixty individuals for their
alleged participation and involved over 350,000 prescriptions. 22 5
The HHS-OIG also plays a role in sanctioning those who have committed
HHS program fraud.226 Under the exclusive authority granted by the Social

U.S.C 1101, 1105, 1115, 1116, 1120-1125); see also S. REP. No. 111-372, at 3 (2010). How INSPECTORS
GENERAL WORK, supra note 1 at 8.
218.

U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERV. OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN., SEMIANNUAL REPORT TO

CONGRESS: OCT. 1, 2019-Mar. 31, 2020 43 (2020).
219.

See U.S. GOv'T

ACCOUNTABILITY OFF.,

GAO-12-820,

HEALTH CARE FRAUD:

TYPES

OF

PROVIDERS INVOLVED IN MEDICARE, MEDICAID, AND THE CHILDREN'S HEALTH INSURANCE PROGRAM

CASES 6-9 (2012).
220.

U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-13-746, HEALTH CARE FRAUD AND ABUSE PROGRAM:

INDICATORS

PROVIDE INFORMATION

ON

PROGRAM

ACCOMPLISHMENTS,

BUT

ASSESSING PROGRAM

EFFECTIVENESS IS DIFFICULT 1 (2013).

221. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, South Florida Health Care Facility Owner Sentenced To
20 Years in Prison for Role in Largest Health Care Fraud Scheme Ever Charged by the Department of
Justice (Sept. 13, 2019), https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdfi/pr/south-fiorida-health-care-facility-ownersentenced-20-years-prison-role-largest-healt-0, archived at https://perma.cc/9XE4-WK57 (last visited

Dec. 2, 2020).
222.

U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERV., OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN., SEMIANNUAL REPORT TO

CONGRESS: OCT. 1, 2019-MAR. 31, 2020 43 (2020).
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Appalachian Regional Prescription Opioid (ARPO) Strike
Force Takedown Results in Charges Against 60 Individuals, Including 53 Medical Professionals (Apr.
17, 2019), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/appalachian-regional-prescription-opioid-arpo-strike-forcetakedown-results-charges-against, archived at https://perma.cc/8N3Y-LYQP (last visited Dec. 2, 2020).
226.

U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-12-820,

HEALTH CARE FRAUD: TYPES OF PROVIDERS

INVOLVED IN MEDICARE, MEDICAID, AND THE CHILDREN'S HEALTH INSURANCE PROGRAM CASES 8 (2012).

2021]

CHALLENGES TO THE INDEPENDENCE OF INSPECTORS GENERAL

243

Security Act, the OIG has the statutory authority to exclude practitioners from
participation in Medicare, Medicaid, and other federal health programs. 227 The
IG can also pursue civil monetary penalties (CMP) against such actors. 2 2 The
OIG may work alongside CMS in taking these enforcement actions. 22 9
The HHS-OIG has been given the authority to manage a sizeable percentage of
HHS Fraud cases at both the investigative and enforcement stages, while the
department focuses on other programs (both within and outside HCFAC). 230
Within HCFAC, the department identifies and investigates the Administration for
Community Living's (ACL) Senior Medicare Patrol programs, as well as
HCFAC-related work conducted by the HHS-OGC, CMS, and FDA. 2 31 Though
the HHS-OIG has proven valuable to the Department, it requires the IG to manage programs and objectively monitor the operation of these programs at the
same time it is charged with agency oversight responsibilities. Although the
department is required to annually report to Congress on the efficacy of HCFAC
programs, the HHS Secretary has chosen to delegate that task to the HHS-QIG,
which means the IG is assessing its own work rather than that of the agency. 232
2. Social Security Administration
The modern Social Security Administration (SSA) was established through the
Social Security Independence and Program Improvements Act of 1994.233 The
mandate of the agency is to "administer the old-age, survivors, and disability insurance program . . . and the supplemental security income program." 23 4 The
SSA OIG was also established in 1994.235 The OIG is directly responsible for
meeting the statutory mission of promoting economy, efficiency, and effectiveness in the administration of SSA programs and operations and for "the prevention of fraud, waste, abuse," and mismanagement in such programs and

227. Office of Inspector General's Special Advisory Bulletin on the Effect of Exclusion from Participation
in Federal Health Care Programs, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND

HUMAN SERVICES (Sept 1999), https://oig.hhs.gov/exclusions/effects-ofexclusion.asp, archived at https://

perma.cc/V6SP-9J6J. (last visited Dec. 2, 2020).
228. Id. In the six month period from Oct. 2019 to Mar. 2020, the HHS-OIG reported 903 exclusions.
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., SEMIANNUAL REP. TO CONG.:

OCT. 1, 2019-MAR. 31, 202048 (2020).
229.

U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-18-88, MEDICARE AND MEDICAID: CMS NEEDS TO

FULLY ALIGN ITS ANTIFRAUD EFFORTS WITH THE FRAUD RISK FRAMEWORK

(2018).

230. For example, HIPAA investigations are outside HCFAC.
231.

U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF, GAO-13-746, HEALTH CARE FRAUD AND ABUSE PROGRAM:

INDICATORS

PROVIDE INFORMATION

EFFECTIVENESS IS DIFFICULT

ON

PROGRAM ACCOMPLISHMENTS,

BUT

ASSESSING

PROGRAM

10-12 (2013).

232. Id. at 11, 23 (2013).
233. See generally Social Security Independence and Program Improvements Act of 1994, Pub. L.

No. 103-296, 108 Stat. 1464. The SSA originated as the Social Security Board, in 1935. See SOC. SEC.
ADMIN., Organizational History, https://www.ssa.gov/history/orghist.html,

3L66-L8JG (last visited July 22, 2020).
234. 42 U.S.C. § 901 (1994).
235. STATUTORY INSPECTORS GENERAL, supra note 53 at 27.

archived at https://perma.cc/

244

THE GEORGETOWN JOURNAL OF LAW & PUBLIC POLICY

[Vol. 19:211

operations. 23 6 To meet its mandate, the OIG leads audits, evaluations, and investigations relating to Social Security programs.23
In addition to its oversight function, the OIG often engages in regulatory
enforcement against organizations and individuals allegedly defrauding social security programs. The OIG coordinates with law enforcement agencies on individual cases of suspected social security fraud. 23 The OIG also works to protect
vulnerable social security recipients through investigations and audits. For
instance, the OIG receives allegations of representative payee 2 3 9 fraud and misuse
from the SSA and law enforcement agencies. 240 In 2011, the SSA OIG participated in an investigation involving a representative payee who had held four
mentally disabled social security recipients captive.24 1 The SSA OIG's role in the
investigation involved gathering evidence, analyzing SSA documents, and interviewing sources. 242
The SSA OIG actively participates in joint task forces. One of these is the SSA
OIG's Cooperative Disability Investigations Program (CDI), a joint effort
between the SSA, SSA OIG, State Disability Determination services, and state
and local law enforcement. 243 The goal of this effort is to "investigate and deter
Social Security disability fraud."24 4 The SSA OIG assigns a CDI team leader,
while the SSA funds the program and assigns a program specialist to provide
technical support and expertise on SSA claims. 245 SSA OIG's Spring 2020
Semiannual Report to Congress projects that CDI investigations in the reporting
period contributed to $62,442,733 in projected savings for SSA programs. 246 In
2019, the New York Field Division arrested a recipient for filing a false claim to
receive more than $101,000 in Social Security retirement and disabilities benefits,

236.

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., SOC. SEC. ADMIN., SEMIANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS: OCT. 1,

2019-MAR. 31, 202041 (2020).
237. SOC. SEC. ADMIN. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., About Our Organization, ttps://oig.ssa.gov/sites/
default/files/About.pdf ttps://perma.cc/9K98-8FFX (last visited July 22, 2020).
238. See e.g. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Just., Plaquemine Man Sentenced to 12 Months in Federal
Prison for Stealing Over $450,000 In a Fraudulent Social Security Benefits Scheme (Jun. 17, 2020)
(investigating a social security recipient for stealing over $450,000 alongside the U.S. Attorney's
Office), ttps://oig.ssa.gov/audits-and-investigations/investigations/june17-la-fraudulent-social-securitybenefit-scheme, archived at https://perma.cc/T2Y8-Q7G6.
239.

U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-19-688, SOCIAL SECURITY BENEFITS: SSA NEEDS TO

IMPROVE OVERSIGHT OF ORGANIZATIONS THAT MANAGE MONEY FOR VULNERABLE BENEFICIARIES

1

(2019).
240. Social Security's Representative Payee Program: Hearing Before Subcomm. on Oversight and
Subcomm. on Soc. Sec. of the H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 115th Cong. 17 (2017) (statement of Gale
Stallworth Stone, Acting Inspector Gen., Soc. Sec. Admin.).

241. Id. at 21.
242. Id.
243.

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., SOC. SEC. ADMIN ., SEMIANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS: OCT. 1,

2019-MAR. 31, 2020 6 (2020).
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. Social Security Administration, Office of the Inspector General, Semiannual Report to
Congress, May 29, 2020, at p.6 (available at https://oig.ssa.gov/sites/default/files/semiannual/SAR-

Spring-2020.pdf).
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which she applied for and received under a second identity. 247 The SSA OIG has
formed other similar task forces to combat other categories of Social Security
fraud.24s
3. Department of Transportation
The Department of Transportation

Act established the Department of

Transportation ("DOT") in 1966 to assure the ".

..

[e]ffective administration

of the transportation systems of the Federal Government. ... " 249 The DOT
OIG was established by the 1978 IG Act. 250 The DOT OIG is charged with
"improv[ing] the performance and integrity of DOT's programs to ensure a safe,
efficient, and effective national transportation system."2 5 1 In addition to conducting agency audits and reviews, the DOT OIG investigates fraud, waste, abuse,
and other violations of law by regulated entities through its investigation programs. For instance, in order to "enhance DOT's transportation goals," the
Transportation Safety Investigation program investigates crimes where death or
serious injury has or is likely to occur.25 2 The OIG emphasizes that their investigations are separate from but complementary to DOT's operating administrations' regulatory enforcement programs.25 3
In 2019, the DOT OIG was involved in the investigation leading to the first federal prosecution concerning the unlawful operation of an unmanned aircraft system (UAS).25 4 The investigation arose when an unlicensed Georgia man used an
unregistered UAS to attempt to deliver contraband to a State prison.2 5 5 The FAA
assisted the DOT OIG in this investigation. 256 The same transportation safety program also investigated the president of multiple commercial passenger bus

247. Press Release, Office of the Inspector Gen., Soc. Sec. Admin., New York Widow with Dual
Identity Arrested for Disability Fraud (Oct. 31, 2019), ttps://oig.ssa.gov/newsroom/news-releases/new-

york-widow-dual-identity-arrested-disability-fraud [https://perma.cc/T4L8-QKMU].
248. For instance, The Westem Pennsylvania U.S. Attorney announced the formation of a COVID-19 Fraud
Task Fome, which will include representatives frm the U.S. Attorney's Office, FBI, Secret Service, ICE/
Homeland Security, the Department of Education OIG, and the SSA OIG. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Just., U.S.
Attorney Scott Brady and Pennsylvania Attorney General Josh Shapim Announce Formation of Joint Western
Pennsylvania COVID-19 Task Force (Mar. 19, 2020), https://www.justice.gov/usao-wdpa/pr/us-attorney-scottbrady-and-pennsylvania-attomey-general-josh-shapim-announce [https://perma.cc/QP8C-6C3W].

249. Department of Transportation Act, Pub. L. No. 89-670, § 2(b)(1), 80 Stat. 931 (1966).
250. 1978 Act.
251. U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., About OIG, https://www.oig.dot.gov/aboutoig (last visited July 22, 2020) [https://perma.cc/NFR7-DBWC].
252. U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., OIG Investigative Priorities, https://www.
oig.dot.gov/investigations/oig-investigative-priorities

(last visited July 20, 2020)

[https://perma.cc/

H5YS-MS2C].
253. Id.
254. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Transp. Office of Inspector Gen., Georgia Man Sentenced to
Prison for Using Unregistered UAS To Deliver a Controlled Substance (Oct. 31, 2019), https://www.oig.

dot.gov/library-item/37583 [https://perma.cc/4ARS-LQHL].
255. Id.
256. Id.
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companies in a multi-state fraud case. 257 The investigation revealed that the company routinely falsified FMCSA reports related to bus safety and driver qualifications.25s The FMCSA assisted the DOT OIG in this investigation. 259
DOT OIG also investigates the illegal shipment of hazardous materials. For
instance, in 2019, the subject of one such investigation, a California trucking
company, pled guilty to the reckless transport of over 100,000 pounds of hazardous materials. 2 0 The company received over $3 million in penalties. 2 1 DOT
OIG special agents also often partner with other law enforcement agencies to
conduct joint investigations. 262 For example, in 2019, the Office conducted an
investigation into a Texas Oil Well Services Company in conjunction with
OSHA, the Department of Labor, the DOJ, and the EPA. 263 This investigation
resulted in the oilfield service company's conviction for an OSHA violation in
the maintenance of its tanker, which led to the death of a welder. 264
4. Department of Agriculture
In 1862, the Department of Agriculture Act established the Department of
Agriculture ("USDA"). 2 6 Congress tasked this department with acquiring and
disseminating "useful information on subjects connected with agriculture . .. and
to procure, propagate, and distribute ... valuable seeds and plants." 266 In addition,
the Agriculture and Food Act grants USDA a broad mandate to investigate violations of laws relating to USDA programs, as well as those alleged to have committed fraud while participating in those programs.26 7
Though its administrative creation occurred in 1962, 268 the 1978 IG Act legislatively established the USDA OIG. 269 The OIG works "with the Department's

257. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Transp. Office of Inspector Gen., Pennsylvania Bus Company
Operator Sentenced (Nov. 19, 2019), https://www.oig.dot.gov/library-item/37602 [https://perma.cc/

PTZ8-QBMD].
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Transp. Office of Inspector Gen., California Trucking Company
Pleads Guilty to Illegal Transportation of Hazardous Material (Feb. 25, 2019), https://www.oig.dot.gov/

library-item/37043 [https://perma.cc/N5TC-LT7N].
261. Id.
262. U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., OIG Law Enforcement Authority, https://
www.oig.dot.gov/oig-law-enforcement-authority (last visited July 20, 2020) [https://perma.cc/87P2-

PTLZ].
263. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Transp. Office of Inspector Gen., Texas Oil Well Services
Company Sentenced for Fatal Safety Violations (Aug. 28, 2019), https://www.oig.dot.gov/library-item/

37409 [https://perma.cc/L9KU-6XBU].
264. Id.
265. Department of Agriculture Act, ch. 72, 12 Stat. 387 (1862).
266. Id. § 1.
267. See U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., Information on OIG's Investigation
Authority, and Criminal Investigations Involving Threats of Violence and Safety Risks, https://www.
usda.gov/sites/default/files/documents/FirearmsMemo.pdf [https://perma.cc/9AL5-PS8J].
268. STATUTORY INSPECTORS GENERAL, supra note 53 at 1.
269. STATUTORY INSPECTORS GENERAL, supra note 53 at 27.
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management team in activities that promote economy, efficiency, and effectiveness or that prevent and detect fraud and abuse in programs and operations, both
within USDA and in non-Federal entities that receive USDA assistance." 270
This Department's broad mandate allows USDA OIG to participate in a wide
range of investigative activities, in conjunction with various federal agencies, to
ensure the safety and security of public health and agriculture. In 2019, the OIG
participated alongside the DEA, DOJ OIG, Homeland Security Investigations,
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, the United States
Marshals Service, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, and the FBI in an investigation of a large-scale illegal dogfighting and drug trafficking operation. 2 71 The

investigation culminated in fifty-one counts of federal dogfighting offenses. 272
The USDA OIG also works in conjunction with other branches of the USDA.
For instance, in 2018, the OIG participated in a fraud investigation of participants
of a federal crop insurance program in partnership with the Internal Revenue
Service ("IRS") and the USDA's Risk Management Agency. The effort uncovered that the participant had stolen more than $5 million in the scheme and
resulted in his incarceration. 273
5. Department of Veterans Affairs
The Consolidation of Veterans Activities Act established the Department of
Veterans Affairs ("VA") as the Veterans' Administration in 1990.274 This statute
elevated the previous Veterans Bureau to a federal agency and allowed the president to "consolidate and coordinate governmental activities affecting war veterans."275 The VA's mission is "to fulfill President Lincoln's promise 'to care for
him who shall have borne the battle, and for his widow, and his orphan' by serving and honoring the men and women who are America's veterans."276 The IG
Act of 1978 established the VA OIG, 277 which oversees Veterans Affairs operations as well as its programs. 278 Congress charged the VA OIG with the authority
270. U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., About OIG, https://www.usda.gov/oig/about.
htm (last visited July 20, 2020) [https://perma.cc/874X-LBGD].
271. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Just., 51-Count Superseding Indictment for Dogfighting
Conspiracy (Dec. 10, 2019), https://www.justice.gov/usao-ndfil/pr/51-count-superseding-indictment-

dogfighting-conspiracy [https://perma.cc/R7ZV-HFV9].
272. Id.
273. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Just., LaGrange Farmer Sentenced for Crop Insurance Fraud,
Fraudulent Federal Crop Disaster Claims, Aggravated Identity Theft and Conspiracy to Commit Money
Laundering (May 30, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/usao-ednc/pr/lagrange-farmer-sentenced-cropinsurance-fraud-fraudulent-federal-crop-disaster-claim-0 [https://perma.cc/BU8V-TP9U].

274. Consolidation of Veterans' Activities, Pub. L. No. 71-536,46 Stat. 1016 (1930).
275. Id. § 1(a).
276. U.S. DEP'T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, About VA, https://www.va.gov/landing2_about.htm#:-:
text=Mission%20Statement,women%20who%20are%20America's%20veterans

(last visited July 20,

2020) [https://perma.cc/NPJ7-4KAC].
277.
278.

1978 Act; STATUTORY INSPECTORS GENERAL, supra note 53 at 27.
U.S. DEP'T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS Office of Inspector Gen., VA

Values, https://www.va.gov/oig/pubs/VA-OIG-Mission-Vision-Values.pdf
[https://perma.cc/75LF-C4ZE].

OIG Mission, Vision, and
(last visited July 20, 2020)
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to oversee the quality of VA healthcare under the Benefits and Services Act of

1988.279

OIG enforcement efforts often involve allegations of VA health care fraud.
For example, in 2019, eight high-level executives of a pharmaceutical company
were sentenced for their participation in a Racketeer Influence and Corrupt
Organizations ("RICO") Act conspiracy. 280 This investigation revealed that these
individuals led a nationwide conspiracy to bribe medical practitioners to unnecessarily prescribe their fentanyl-based narcotic drug. 281 These individuals also conspired to defraud health insurance providers, including the VA's Civilian Health
and Medical Program ("CHAMPVA"), which paid approximately $3.3 million
for the drug. This investigation was conducted in conjunction with a series of
agencies and agency OIGs. 2 2
The OIG has also investigated violations of laws designed to set standards for
the health and safety of medical devices and medications. In 2018, the VA OIG
investigated a violation of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act in cooperation with
the HHS OIG, FDA, and other agencies. 283A medical device manufacturer pled
guilty to distributing an adulterated device, as well as to marketing said device
for unproven and unsafe uses.284
The VA OIG also investigates reports of alleged false claims related to VA
beneficiaries. For instance, an investigation revealed the daughter of a deceased
VA beneficiary continued to collect and spend her father's VA benefits following
his death. 2 ' The Office similarly investigates medical professionals and administrators alleged to be involved in submitting false claims on behalf of the VA, often collaborating with agencies such as IRS and other OIGs. 286
6. Environmental Protection Agency
President Nixon's presidential directive established the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA").28 7 Nixon's plan consolidated the piecemeal environmental protection functions of various federal agencies under one federal agency
with the mandate to establish and enforce environmental protection standards, to
conduct environmental research, to provide assistance to others combatting

279.

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP'T OF VETERAN'S AFFAIRS, SEMIANNUAL

CONGRESS: ISSUE 83 OCTOBER 1,

2019-

MARCH

REPORT TO

31, 2020 Iv (2020).

280. Id. at 35.
281. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Just., Founder and Owner of Pharmaceutical Company Insys
Arrested and Charged with Racketeering (Oct. 26, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/usao-ma/pr/founder[https://perma.cc/L8A3and-owner-pharmaceutical-company-insys-arrested-and-charged-racketeering

H787].
282. Id.
283.

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP'T OF VETERAN'S AFFAIRS, SEMIANNUAL

CONGRESS: ISSUE 83 OCTOBER 1, 2019- MARCH

284.
285.
286.
287.

REPORT TO

31, 2020 30 (2020).

Id.
Id. at 28.
Id. at 32.
See Jack Lewis, The Birth of EPA, 11 EPA J., 6, 8 (1985) (discussing the creation and early

years of the EPA).
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environmental pollution, and to recommend new policies for environmental protection. 288 The EPA's OIG was created pursuant to the Inspector General Act of
1978.289 The OIG's role is to detect and prevent fraud, waste, and abuse in order
to assist the EPA to efficiently and effectively protect human health and the
environment. 290

The

OIG states that one of its goals is to contribute to EPA's programs and

operations. 2 91 For instance, the EPA

OIG assisted in an investigation to resolve

allegations that Duke University violated the False Claims Act by submitting
applications and reports containing falsified research in order to receive funding
for grants. 292 Although the investigation uncovered significant misconduct, 293 this
was a case of the EPA directly involving itself in an investigation outside the
scope of the IG Act.
Additionally, the EPA OIG works directly with the Agency in investigations.
In 2014, a joint investigation by the EPA OIG and the EPA CID resulted in the
sentencing of two corporations and four individuals. 294 The investigation revealed
that these entities and individuals were involved in a scheme to unlawfully sell
unregistered pesticides shown to be harmful to the environment. 2 95 Though it is

undeniable that the agencies produced commendable results, this is an example
of the OIG impermissibly operating in an enforcement role against the public,
rather than in an oversight capacity as the "eyes and ears" of Congress.
7. United States Postal Service
The Postal Reorganization Act established the United States Postal Service
("USPS") as an independent agency of the Executive Branch. 296 Its congressional mandate is to "provide prompt, reliable, and efficient services to patrons in
all areas and . .. render postal services to all communities. "297 The USPS Office
of the Inspector General was created pursuant to the IG Act Amendments of

288. Id. (discussing the creation and early years of the EPA).]
289. 1978 Act; see also STATUTORY INSPECTORS GENERAL, supra note 53 at 27.

290. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., ENVTL.
OCTOBER 1, 2019-MARCH 31, 2020 1 (2020).
291. Id.

PROT. AGENCY, SEMIANNUAL

REPORT TO CONGRESS:

292. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Duke University Agrees to Pay U.S. $112.5 Million to
Settle False Claims Act Allegations Related to Scientific Research Misconduct (Mar. 25, 2019), https://

www.justice.gov/opa/pr/duke-university-agrees-pay-us- 1125-million-settle-false-claims-actallegations-related [https://perma.cc/SH7Q-S56C].
293. Id.
294. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Two Tampa Corporations and Four Tampa Residents
Sentenced in Connection with Scheme to Unlawfully Sell an Unregistered Pesticide and Obstruct Justice
(Dec. 5, 2014), https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdfi/pr/two-tampa-corporations-and-four-tampa-residentssentenced-connection-scheme-unlawfully [https://perma.cc/LE4R-GSWF].

295. Id.
296. See Postal Reorganization Act, Pub. L. No. 91-375, 84 Stat. 719 (1970), (codified as amended at
39 U.S.C. § 201 (2018)); see also U.S. POSTAL SERV., The United States Postal Service: An American
History 64-65 (2020).
297. 39 U.S.C. § 101(a) (2018).
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1988.298 The OIG's ultimate mission is to "help maintain confidence in the postal
system and improve the Postal Service's bottom line through independent audits
and investigations.'' 2 99 Until 1988, the USPS Inspector General also held the position of Chief Postal Inspector of the Postal Inspection Service. 300 These positions
were split in 1996.301 In 2006, the Chairman of the Board of Governors signed a
memorandum announcing that the Postal Inspection Service would have full
responsibility for the investigation of external crimes. 30 2
Despite the separation of the USPS Inspector General and Chief Postal
Inspector roles and functions, the USPS OIG plays an active role in enforcement
efforts against the public. A significant portion of cases are healthcare-related
investigations. 303 For instance, the USPS OIG was involved in an investigation of
a pharmaceutical company for antitrust and related False Claims Act violations. 30 4 In a statement, the special agent in charge emphasized the millions the
Postal Service spends yearly on healthcare-associated costs. 305
Special agents of the OIG investigate frauds against the Postal Service to
help safeguard the Agency's resources and deter postal crimes, 306 sometimes
alongside the branches of the Postal Service. For example, the OIG investigates
allegations of schemes to illegally distribute drugs by mail. 30 7 In 2019, the OIG
investigated a scheme to mail marijuana through the postal system in

298. Inspector General Act Amendments of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-504, 102 Stat. 2524; see also
infra note ,357, at 29. The USPS OIG is distinct from other OIGs in various crucial ways. The USPS IG
is appointed by the nine presidentially-appointed governors of the U.S. Postal Service. 39 U.S.C. § 202
(2018). The USPS IG is also the only statutory IG with a term limit. See infra note 335, at 33. Finally,
the USPS IG can only be removed for cause by at least seven of the nine governors. 39 U.S.C. § 202(e)

(2018).
299. U.S. POSTAL SERV. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., ABOUT THE OIG, https://www.uspsoig.gov/
about-us/about-oig (last visited July 20, 2020) [https://perma.cc/PJE9-S9Z4].
300.

U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO/AIMD-96-150, INSPECTORS GENERAL: A COMPARISON OF

CERTAIN ACTIVITIES OF THE POSTAL IG AND OTHER IGS 3 (1996).

301. Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act, 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-379
(1996) (codified as amended at 39 U.S.C. app. §8G (2018)). The Act also granted the USPS OIG law
enforcement authority. Id.; see also CONG. RSCH SERV., R43722, OFFICES OF INSPECTORS GENERAL AND
LAW ENFORCEMENT AUTHORITY: IN BRIEF 5 (2014).
302. U.S. GOv'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO 07-138, INSPECTORS GENERAL: ACTIVITIES OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF STATE OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 26 (2007).
303.

See U.S. POSTAL SERV. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., HEALTH CARE PROVIDER FRAUD, https://

www.uspsoig.gov/investigations/provider-fraud

(last visited July 20, 2020) [https://perma.cc/XPY9-

82W3].
304. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Pharmaceutical Company Admits to Price Fixing in Violation
of Antitrust Law, Resolves Related False Claims Act Violations (May 31, 2019), https://www.justice.gov/opa/
pr/pharmaceutical-company-admits-price-fixing-violation-antitrust-law-resolves-related-false [https://perma.

cc/B4CY-NDNQ].
305. Id.
306.

U.S. POSTAL SERV. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., OFFICE OF INVESTIGATIONS: INTRODUCTION,

https://www.uspsoig.gov/investigations (last visited July 20, 2020) [https://perma.cc/JE8B-A6A7].
307. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Two Men Sentenced in Marijuana Scheme Through U.S.
Postal Service (Nov. 19, 2019), https://www.uspsoig.gov/sites/default/files/document-library-files/2019/

DOJNews_2019_11_19.pdf [https://perma.ccIW62L-YKTU].
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coordination with the United States Postal Inspection Service and other federal
agencies.30 8
8. Federal Communications Commission
The Communications Act of 1934 established the Federal Communication
Commission (FCC) for the purpose of regulating interstate and international communications. 30 9 The Commission is responsible for implementing and enforcing
communications law and regulations. 310 The FCC Office of Inspector General
(OIG) was established pursuant to the IG Amendments Act of 198831 and aids
the Commission in its efforts to improve "operational and program effectiveness
and efficiency. "312
Even though the FCC has a distinct enforcement bureau, 313 the OIG often
investigates allegations of criminal misconduct and civil fraud relating to FCC
programs.31 4 For instance, the OIG investigates the FCC's "E-Rate" program,
which distributes funds for telecommunication services and internet access to
schools and libraries serving economically disadvantaged children.3" In 2020,
the FCC OIG worked alongside the FBI to uncover a multimillion dollar scheme
to defraud the E-Rate program, in which false claims were filed to enrich school
officials and vendors at the expense of underprivileged children. 316
The OIG has also worked in cooperation with other FCC bureaus and offices in
its investigations. In 2013, the FCC OIG and the Office of General Counsel
worked together to investigate allegations that AT&T was knowingly overbilling
an FCC program which compensates service providers for placing calls on behalf
of the hearing or speech impaired. 317 More recently, the OIG and the

308. Id.
309. Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-416, § 1, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934) (codified as
amended at 47 U.S.C. 151) (2018); see also infra note 310.
310.

See CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R45699, THE FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION: CURRENT

STRUCTURE AND ITS ROLE IN THE CHANGING TELECOMMUNICATIONS LANDSCAPE 1 (2020).

311. See infra note 335, at 28. The FCC OIG was originally established as a designated federal entity
(DFE). Id. In 2018, the FCC IG became an establishment IG, pursuant to the Consolidated

Appropriations Act of 2018. Id.
312.

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., FED. COMMC'NS COMM'N., SEMIANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS:

OCTOBER 1, 2019-MARCH 31, 2020 41 (2020).
313. The Enforcement Bureau (EB) is the primary enforcement mechanism for the Communications
Act of 1934 as amended, other FCC statues, as well as FCC rules and orders. FED. COMMUNIC'NS
COMM'N ENF'T BUREAU, ENFORCEMENT OVERVIEW 4 (2020).

314. See supra note 312, at 7.
315. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Seven Defendants Plead Guilty To Defrauding Federal Pogram
That Provided Technology Funding For Rockland County Schools (Feb. 12, 2020), https://www.justice.gov/
usao-sdny/pr/seven-defendants-plead-guilty-defrauding-federal-program-provided-technology-funding.
[https://

perma.cc/4YDR-2FXH].
316. See supra note 312, at FED. 13-14.
317. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, AT&T Agrees to Settle Allegations Involving IP Relay
Services Provided to Hearing-and-Speech-Impaired Persons (Nov. 7, 2013), https://transition.fcc.gov/

oig/DOJPressRelease_13-civ-1191.pdf.
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Enforcement Bureau investigated an allegation that a broadcasting company had
violated the False Claims Act in its contract with the FCC. 318
9. State Department
The State Department was established in 1789 as the Department of
Foreign Affairs, pursuant to an "act establishing an Executive Department, to
be denominated the Department of Foreign Affairs.." 319 The Department's
mandate is to lead United States foreign policy through "diplomacy, advocacy, and assistance by advancing the interests of the American people, their
safety and economic prosperity. '320 The Department of State Office of
Inspector General (DOS OIG), as currently organized, was established
through amendments to the IG Act in 1985321 and 1986.322 In addition to the
traditional functions of an Inspector General's Office as delineated in the IG
Act, the DOS OIG is required by statute to undergo inspections of the
Department's bureaus and posts worldwide.323
The OIG investigates allegations of fraud, waste, and mismanagement that
may be either criminal or in violation of Agency regulations. 324 For instance, the

OIG investigates allegations of fraud in the State Department's grant programs. 325
The OIG's Spring 2020 semiannual report states that roughly 14% of investigations for that reporting period involved allegations of grant fraud.3 26 In January
2020, a Department grantee falsified documents related to a grant intended to support youth centers in marginalized areas of the Middle East.327 Another grantee
and five companies were debarred for their roles in a bid rigging conspiracy to

318. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Florida-Based Broadcasting Company Ordered to Pay
$910,700 to Federal Communications Commission (Sept. 6, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/pr/
florida-based-broadcasting-company-ordered-pay-910700-federal-communications-commission [https://

perma.cc/87VZ-HQ7V].
319. Department of Foreign Affairs Act, 1 Stat. 28 (1789) (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. § 2651
(2018)).
320.

U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, ABOUT THE U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, https://www.state.gov/about/about-

the-u-s-department-of-state/ [https://perma.cc/SR2V-CKBA] (last visited July 22, 2020).
321. Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Pub. L. No. 99-93, § 150, 99 Stat. 405, 427 (1985).
322. Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-399, 100 Stat. 853
(1986); see also U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO 07-138, INSPECTORS GENERAL: ACTIVITIES OF
THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 10-11 (2007). In 1998, the DOS OIG

expanded to include the Broadcasting Board of Governors. See infra note 335, at 28.

323. See Foreign Service Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-465, § 209, 94 Stat. 2071, 2080 (1980)
(codified as amended 22 U.S.C.§ 3929 (2018)). Congress often waives this periodic inspection,
applying a risk-based approach instead. See U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO 11-382T, STATE
DEPARTMENT
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CONCERNS ARE UNDER WAY 3 (2011).

324.

U.S. DEP'T OF STATE OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., ABOUT OIG, https://www.stateoig.gov/about

[https://perma.cc/ZJ4B-FPJC] (last visited July 22, 2020).
325.

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, SEMIANNUAL REPORT TO THE CONGRESS

OCTOBER 1, 2019, TO MARCH 31, 2020 25-28 (2020).
326. Id. at 25.
327_ Id. at 28.
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steer contracts for kickbacks, affecting a program that provides learning opportunities for refugee children.3 2
In the past, GAO has expressed concerns over potential overlap of investigative functions between the OIG and the Bureau of Diplomatic Security (BDS) in
cases of passport and visa fraud.3 29 In 2010, the two entities entered into a memorandum of understanding delineating the responsibilities of each, including areas
of overlap.330 The OIG continues to investigate cases of visa and passport fraud.
In 2017, a joint OIG and Department of Homeland Security investigation
revealed a nationwide fraud scheme designed to profit unlawfully from
Department exchange visitor programs.331 The victims came to the United States
believing they would be part of the Department's Intern and Training Program
but instead, were exploited for their labor and paid only a fraction of what they
earned.3 3 2
10. Internal Revenue Service
The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) is a bureau of the Department of the
Treasury. The IRS originated with the Office of the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue under the Internal Revenue Act of 1862.333 The modern IRS was created
pursuant to the Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of

1998.334
The Department of the Treasury has two IGs, the Department of the Treasury
IG and the Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration (TIGTA). 335
TIGTA serves as the IRS OIG. 336 TIGTA was established under the Internal
Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998.337 TIGTA encourages
" ... economy, efficiency, [and] effectiveness in the administration of the internal
revenue laws." 338 It also works to prevent and detect fraud, waste, and abuse
within the IRS and related entities. 339

328. Id.
329.

See U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF.,

GAO 07-138,

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 5, 25

330. See OFFICE OF

INSPECTORS GENERAL: ACTIVITIES OF

(2007).

INSPECTOR GEN, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE BROAD. BD. OF GOVERNORS, INSPECTION

OFFICE OF INVESTIGATIONS AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE,
DIVISIONS OF SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS, CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS, AND COMPUTER INVESTIGATIONS

OF THE BUREAU OF DIPLOMATIC SECURITY,
AND FORENSICS
331.

3 (2013); see also report cited supra note 323, at 11.

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, SEMIANNUAL REPORT TO THE CONGRESS

OCTOBER 1, 2017, TO MARCH 31, 2018 27 (2018).
332. Id.
333. Internal Revenue Act of 1862, 12 Stat. 432 (1862).
334.

Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-206, 112

Stat. 685 (1998).
335. See STATUTORY INSPECTORS GENERAL, supra note 53 at 5-6.

336. Id.
337.

Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-206

§

1103,

112 Stat. 685, 705 (1998).
338. https://www.treasury.gov/tigta/.
339. About TIGTA, TREASURY INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN. (May 25, 2018), https://www.
treasury.gov/tigta/about.shtml, archivedat https://perma.cc/F8SZ-UKXZ.
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In addition to internal audits and investigations, TIGTA also addresses threats
of violence against the IRS and "external attempts to corruptly interfere with
Federal tax administration. "340 For example, TIGTA investigates external crimes,
including fraudulently filed IRS documents. 341 In 2018, TIGTA investigated two
individuals who attempted to fraudulently obtain President Trump's tax
returns. 342 TIGTA also investigates instances where scammers impersonate IRS
employees in order to obtain personal information or steal money from taxpayers. 343 In addition, TIGTA investigates cybercrimes. For instance, TIGTA
was involved in an investigation into high-profile attacks against the IRS web
portal and the FAFSA website. 344 Other external issues TIGTA investigates
include falsely or frivolously filed documents against IRS employees, instances
of fraud related to contracts awarded by the IRS, and misuse of the IRS seal and
symbols. 345
C. The Problem with ParallelEnforcement

The foregoing ten examples describe how some IGs are deeply involved in
agency law enforcement activities. At the same time, the text, structure, and
intent of the IG Act clearly provides that IGs should not become overly entangled
with their agencies. Congress organizes the federal government and establishes
departments, agencies, commissions and other instrumentalities to accomplish
objectives pursuant to statutory directives. 346 Cabinet secretaries, agency commissioners, and other heads of department are charged with administering these
statutes, which may include enforcement and investigative authority. 347 These are
not the functions for which IGs were established.
This problem is examined in two appellate cases addressing IG investigatory
powers. In Burlington Northern Railroad Co. v. Office of Inspector General,
RailroadRetirement Board, 983 F.2d 631 (5th Cir. 1993), the court considered
whether an IG could enforce a subpoena issued in aid of a regularly scheduled tax
compliance audit, rather than the detection of fraud and abuse. The trial court had
found that the audit "did not include any oversight element but ... had as its goal
the carrying out of program responsibilities.'' 348 In examining the language and
intent of the IG Act, the court affirmed a lower court decision and held that IGs

340. Office of Investigations, TREASURY INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN. (Nov. 19, 2018), https://
www.treasury.gov/tigta/ oi.shtml, archived at https://perma.cc/J55Z-RK2Y.
341.

See, e.g., TREASURY INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN.,

SEMIANNUAL REP. TO CONGRESS:

OCTOBER 1, 2019-MARCH 31, 2020 23-24 (2020) (man found guilty of wire fraud and aggravated
identity theft for filing fraudulent Federal income tax returns using the names and SSNs of others and
claiming tax refunds to which he was not entitled).

342.
343.
344.
345.

Id. at 25.
Id. at 26.
Id. at 23.
Id.

346. See supra n.35 and accompanying text.

347. Id.
348. Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Office of Inspector Gen., R.R. Ret. Bd., 983 F.2d 631, 638 (5th Cir.
1993).
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lacked statutory authority to conduct "regulatory compliance investigations or
audits," meaning those "most appropriately viewed as being within the authority
of the agency itself." 349 The force of the court's reasoning, based on the language
of the statute, applies regardless of whether Congress subsequently might choose
to amend the law and expand the IG's authority. Specifically, the court pointed
out that, if an IG "assume[s] an agency's regulatory compliance function, [the
IG's] independence and objectiveness-qualities that Congress has expressly
recognized are essential... would, in our view, be compromised." 350 Indeed, for
that reason, the House drafters of the IG Act expressly disclaimed the IG's jurisdiction over "audits and investigations constituting an integral part of' any
agency program that would potentially be audited or investigated by the IG.351
The court ruled that the goal for IGs should be exercising oversight of "the internal operations of the departments and agencies. "352
In Truckers Unitedfor Safety v. Mead, 251 F.3d 183 (D.C. Cir. 2001), the court
held that, without specific congressional authorization, the Department of
Transportation IG could not conduct investigations of private party compliance
with provisions of its host agency regulations. The court pointed out that the IG's
mandate "focuses on systemic agency-wide issues." 5 3 The IG Act, the court
found, "specifically prohibits" IGs from assuming "program operating responsibilities."35 4 While the court understood "honest cooperation" between an IG and
its host agency, this would not authorize the IG to "enforc[e] motor carrier safety
regulations-a role which is central to the basic operationsof the agency. as The
court determined that the joint project at issue, seeking to "combine the efforts of
OIG and [agency] staffs" to review the operations of regulated entities, was not
authorized by statute and was therefore unlawful. 356 Congress may have a host of
reasons for expanding IG authority to enhance the efficacy of the host agency, but
the D.C. Circuit found that those reasons are not consistent with the IG's fundamental oversight responsibilities and the need to protect IG independence.
The 1978 IG Act establishes IGs inside covered departments "to create independent and objective units" to "conduct and supervise audits and investigations

349.
350.
351.
352.

Id. at 642.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. (emphasis omitted).
Id. (emphasis omitted) (citing 124 Cong. Rec. 10,405 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1978) (statement of

Rep. Levitas)). The court found support as well from the Department of Justice's Office of Legal
Counsel, which had previously prepared a memorandum addressing the question of IG authority to
conduct investigations pursuant to statutes that provide the host agency with regulatory jurisdiction over
private individuals and entities that do not receive federal funds. Id. at 642-43 (citing Inspector General

Authority to Conduct Regulatory Investigations, 13 Op. O.L.C. 54 (1989)).
353. Truckers United for Safety v. Mead, 251 F.3d 183, 186 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
354. Id.
355. Id. at 189 (emphasis added). Congress subsequently amended the power of the IG to investigate
persons subject to the agency's jurisdiction. Id. Compare id. with Winters Ranch P'ship v. Viadero, 123
F.3d 327 (5th Cir. 1997) (upholding IG's subpoena because it was part of an investigation to test the
effectiveness of the agency's conduct of a program and not part of program operating responsibilities).

356. Truckers United for Safety, 251 F.3d at 187, 190.

256

THE GEORGETOWN JOURNAL OF LAW & PUBLIC POLICY

[Vol.

19:211

relating to the programs and operations" of the covered departments 357 and "to
provide leadership and coordination and recommend policies for activities
designed (A) to promote economy, efficiency, and effectiveness in the administration of, and (B) to prevent and detect fraud and abuse in, such programs and
operations." 358 The duties and responsibilities of IGs are far-ranging: providing
policy direction to their agencies; reviewing legislation and regulation and making recommendations about the impact on economy and efficiency of their agencies and the detection of fraud and abuse; recommending and supervising the
implementation of policies for promoting economy and efficiency and preventing
fraud and abuse; taking the lead intergovernmental role in promoting economy
and efficiency and preventing and detecting fraud and abuse; and keeping the
agency head and Congress "fully and currently informed" of problems. 359 This is
a difficult role, and members of Congress are not always receptive to receiving
complex or nuanced information. 360
Maintaining independence is difficult. There are many seemingly good reasons
for IGs to collaborate with their host agencies, but this "can produce conflicting
pressures for [IGs] when independence might be compromised. ... "361 The same
problem that Chairman Fountain identified to Department of Labor Comptroller
Zuck 362 exists today when IG offices-even separate divisions, even separate
teams-become involved in agency initiatives because they eventually report "to
the person . . . also responsible" for "maximum independence and objectivity",
viz., the Inspector General. Whether Inspectors General are more auditors and internal investigators-authorized to investigate the operations of the government
and the conduct of government employees and contractors and federal funds
recipients-or functionally part of the mechanism by which the government
accomplishes its programmatic mission, is answered in the text of the IG Act.
To the extent that IGs are compromised through entanglement in the operations
of their host agencies, they are less independent and therefore, less useful and

357. 5 U.S.C. app.
358. Id. § 2(2).
359. Id. § 4(a).

§ 2(1).

360. See PETER H. SCHUCK, WHY GOVERNMENT FAILS So OFTEN: AND How IT CAN Do BETTER 168
(2014) ("Members of Congress, at the summit of our system, receive a veritable tsunami of information,
but much or most of it is highly biased and selective. Their main sources-lobbyists, party organs, and
staff-are self-interested, partisan, pre-committed, and result-oriented, not objective problem-solvers.
Members' positions on many important issues are predetermined by their party affiliations and
campaign pledges, and are usually not open to significant revision in light of new or better information.
Preternaturally busy people, they typically spend most of their time on fund-raising, campaigning,
subcommittee work, and constituency-tending. Consequently, they have little time to read or think
deeply about issues, and in any event politicians are seldom drawn to such passive activities. Instead,
they rely on cues, party and staff summaries, and various politics-specific heuristics and routines for
processing information and voting.").
361. TRUTH TELLERS, supra note 20 at 123.
362. See supra n.158 and accompanying text; Establishment of Offices of Inspector General:
Hearing on H.R. 2819 Before the Subcomm. on Intergovernmental Rel. & Hum. Res. of the H. Comm. on

Gov't Operations, 95th Cong. 166 (1977).
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reliable to Congress for this important purpose. 363 To the extent IGs devote more
time to the performance of those congressionally mandated activities outside the
scope of the IG Act, this comes at the expense of the duties generally assigned to
them by the 1978 Inspector General Act. Entanglement also compromises IGs'
ability to set their office priorities independently. By assigning more duties to IGs
that overlap with those of their host agencies, Congress helps to create a common
identity of interest between the IG and their host agency. This raises the prospect
of regulatory capture. 364 As former Department of Homeland Security Inspector
General John Roth testified:
Once you have lost that perception of independence, you are pretty much
done, because ... the only difference between me and the rest of the 225,000
people in the Department of Homeland Security is that I am, in fact, independent and am perceived to be that way. That is the value that we add, and once
you lose that, you can never be effective again. 365

Good policy and management practice require that IGs do not entangle themselves with their agencies. 366 Entanglement will result at best in operational confusion, thus confusing both the public and the host agency staff. The relationship
between Congress and the Executive already entails plenty of complicated negotiations and accommodations. 367 Blurring the lines between agency and IG further

363. William S. Fields & Thomas E. Robinson, Legal and Functional Influences on the Objectivity

of the Inspector General Audit Process, 2 Geo. Mason Indep. L. Rev. 97, 110-11 (1993).

&

364. "In its classic form, capture theory involves three actors: an agency, the congressional
committee that oversees that agency, and a powerful interest group. In order to secure favorable
regulations, the interest group (so the story goes) will aggressively lobby committee members and
provide support, financial or otherwise, for the members' reelection efforts. Those committee members
will then pressure the agencies to enact favorable regulations. Because the rest of Congress will be
largely oblivious to the activities of that committee and the agency, this "iron triangle" will inevitably
cater to the interest group's narrow desires to the detriment of the public interest." Nicholas Bagley

Richard L. Revesz, Centralized Oversight of the Regulatory State, 106 Colum. L. Rev. 1260, 1284
(2006). See also George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI.
3, 5 (1971) ("[E]very industry or occupation that has enough political power to utilize the state will seek
to control entry."). IG efforts to "divest their offices of program operating responsibilities [often meet]
with resistance from Congress." Fields & Robinson, supra note 363, at 110. This should be a warning
sign, at least raising the question as to the benefits members of Congress obtain from compromising IG
independence. "The political branches [are potentially] more attuned to the interests of those narrow
interest groups than to the desires of the general public." Bagley & Revesz, supra note 364 at 1285
(internal citations and quotations omitted). See also Steven P. Croley, REGULATION AND PUBLIC
INTERESTS: THE POSSIBILITY OF GOOD REGULATORY GOVERNMENT 14-25 (2008) (outlining "the cynical
view" of public choice theory).
365. Improving the Efficiency, Effectiveness, and Indep. of Inspectors Gen., Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on Homeland Sec. and Governmental Aff., 114th Cong. 13 (2015) (testimony of John Roth,
Inspector Gen., Dep't of Homeland Sec.).
366. Fields & Robinson, supra note 363, at 109-10 ("[I]t is difficult for Inspector Generals to
impartially evaluate and criticize their agencies' management practices and programs if they are
themselves taking an active role in program management."). Again there is a supra to a later note.
367.

CHRISTOPHER H. FOREMAN, SIGNALS FROM THE HILL: CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT AND THE

CHALLENGE OF SOCIAL REGULATION 12 (1988) ("A wealth of informal monitoring and bargaining
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complicates this process. Congress depends on Inspectors Generals to provide independent, timely, and actionable information on the operations of the federal
government. 368
Regulators are captured "when [they] are in a constant state of 'being persuaded' ... based on the persuader's identity rather than an argument's merits. "369
Two of the warning signs of capture are: (a) issue framing by the regulated entity 370 and (b) substitution of the regulated entity's welfare for (or conflation
with) the public good. 371 The text and history of the IG Act indisputably require
that IGs regulate their host agencies and report to Congress, not perform program
operations or otherwise regulate the public. 372 But these commands are broad and
convey discretion to the "regulator." Those regulators are statutorily "identified"
with their host agencies. Regulators examine many issues as they arise within the
agency. These individuals see their role in part as contributing to the good of
the host agency. To the extent that IGs "balance" those host agency interests with
the interests of Congress, they risk undermining their independence and ability to
keep Congress impartially informed.
One may further consider the problem from the perspective of corporate auditors. Auditors are required to be independent, but, the phrase "independence"
itself does not possess a concrete definition. 373 Generally Accepted Government
Auditing Standards ("GAGAS") provide that auditors must be "independent,"
but the requirements contained in the standards relate to the appearance of objectivity. 374 Even the professional paradigm of auditors' and their "clients" necessarily blurs the obligation that auditors owe first and foremost to the rules under
which they operate. 375 One cannot "'stand separate and apart' from the client's

&

constantly fieshes out the structural bones of both the congressional division of labor and the legislativeexecutive relationship.").
368. "Congress is more concerned about independence involving OIG-agency relationships than
about OIGs' relationship with Congress." CHARLES A. JOHNSON ET AL., IBM CENTER FOR Bus.
GoV'T, BALANCING INDEP. AND POSITIVE ENGAGEMENT: How INSPECTORS GEN. WORK WITH AGENCIES
AND CONGRESS 21

(2015).
&

369. Scott Hempling, Regulatory Capture: Sources and Solutions, 1 EMORY CORP. GOVERNANCE
ACCOUNTABILITY REV. 23, 25 (2014) (emphasis added).

370. Id. at 26.
371. Id. at 28.
372. See supra n.156 et seq. and accompanying text.
373. American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) and SEC "rules on auditor independence
are lengthy and subject to constant reinterpretation, and both bodies have abandoned attempts to pmvide a
concise definition." Rick Antle, Auditor Independence, 22 J. ACCT'G RES. 1 (1984). See also Plain English Guide
to Independence, ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL CERTIFIED PROFESSIONAL ACCOUNTANTS 1 (August 2017)
("Independence is the state of mind that permits [the auditor] to perform ... without being affected by influences
that compomise professional judgment ... [and] exemise objectivity and professional skepticism.") (emphasis
added),
https://www.aicpa.org/interestareas/pmfessionalethics/resoures/tools/downloadabledocuments/plain%

20english%20guide.pdf (last visited August 28, 2020), [https://penna.cc/W7T7-LGJY)].
374. U.S. GOV'T Accountability Office, GAO-18-568G, GOVERNMENT AUDITING STANDARDS, 2018
REVISION, 28-30 (2018).
375. See William W. Bratton, ShareholderValue and Auditor Independence, 53 DUKE L.J. 439, 440
(2003).
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business and at the same time be an agent beholden to the [business itself]."376
Just as "[en]mesh[ing]" auditors in an agency relationship with shareholders
"subject[s] [them] to the principal's control,"377 IGs must be careful not to
become "enmesh[ed]" in the regulatory or programmatic initiatives of their host
agencies lest they compromise their independence. Separating audit functions
from other functions may lend the appearance of objectivity to audits, but it does
not help make other functions that OIGs perform more independent or objective.
At this point, one may be tempted to argue that fidelity to the statutory mandate
alone is insufficient grounds for concern regarding IGs becoming overly
enmeshed in the programs and operations of their host agencies. If there are efficiencies in combining human resources; if there are areas for performance
improvements in joint operations; if there are possibilities to cut costs through
consolidation; why should anyone care? Perhaps the lessons of regulatory theory
might shed some light on the question. One might believe that the regulatory process, in general, is efficient and effective and that the existence of potential problems is attributed solely to the presence of undue outside ("political")
interference from Congress or a lack of support inside the Executive Branch. But
there are sound theoretical reasons to believe that "inherent in the regulatory process is a persistent tendency to make socially undesirable policy"-even if the
agency is motivated not to promote the regulated industry. 378 Meanwhile,
"Congress and the president ... heap ever greater responsibilities on government,
always comfortable in the belief that the . . . legion of auditors and investigators
[will] make sure everything work[s] out." 379 In this context, IGs relying solely on
their judgment and discretion-rather than clear standards or guidelines-risk
entangling themselves in the same web of incentives that agencies diligently
attempt to avoid. Moreover, there are no mechanisms for preventing or correcting

376. Id. at 444 (internal quotations omitted).

377. Id. (emphasis added).
378.

ROGER NOLL, REFORMING REGULATION: AN EVALUATION OF THE ASH COUNCIL PROPOSALS

40

(1971). Regulated parties can make important contributions to the development of regulations. But in
that process they may also gain undue influence over regulators. See Rachel E. Barkow, Insulating

Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through Institutional Design, 89 TEX. L. REV. 15, 23 (2010); Richard B.
Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1669, 1713-14 (1975).
For detailed discussion of this phenomenon, see Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican Justification for

the Bureaucratic State, 105 Harv. L. Rev. 1511, 1565-70 (1992) (consider "the ability of an ostensibly
regulated industry to influence government policy [as set forth by] the capture hypothesis...."). See
generally PREVENTING REGULATORY CAPTURE: SPECIAL INTEREST INFLUENCE AND HOw TO LIMIT IT,

(Daniel Carpenter & David Moss eds., 2013). Moreover, regulators depend on the regulated for
observable success metrics, and the information asymmetries favor the regulated in most cases. ROGER
NOLL, REFORMING REGULATION: AN EVALUATION OF THE ASH COUNCIL PROPOSALS 40-41 (1971).

Agencies can embark on costly information-gathering and decision-making procedures, but these may
have the side effect of raising the costs of entering a regulatory dispute. Id. See also Michael E. Levine
& Jennifer L. Forrence, Regulatory Capture, Public Interest, and the Public Agenda: Toward a
Synthesis, 6 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 167, 170 (1990) ("Postrevisionist theories demonstrate that modern
democratic government allows many political actors to be free from oversight by the electorate or by
those who do answer to the electorate.").
379. MONITORING GOVERNMENT, supra notes 10, 57.
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potential entanglement. The only established process to address these problems is
for the IGs themselves to report misconduct to CIGIE. 3 80
Worse, from the perspective of promoting the interest of sound governmental
oversight, such entanglement potentially confuses whistleblowers and compromises the independence and ability of IGs to oversee the agency as Congress
intended. As the Office of Legal Counsel previously stated, IGs cannot serve as a
"check on the mistreatment or abuse of the general public by government employees" if they are "conducting and supervising regulatory investigations."...381 IGs
should scrupulously avoid the possibility of "confus[ing] the press and public" or
"creat[ing] pitfalls for potential whistleblowers [who] may believe [they are]
approaching an independent arbiter and end up sadly mistaken." 38 2 Potential
whistleblowers may be scared off if they believe that the Office of Inspector
General as a whole, not just the IG, is "susceptible to pressures" from agency
management. 38 3 "Scaring off would-be whistleblowers" occurs when the IG
creates the impression that the office is either: (a) too busy or (b) too connected
to the agency. 384
Notions of due process385 and fundamental fairness to investigatory targets
also caution against entanglement between IGs with their agencies and operations.386 Requiring the targets of investigations to engage with multiple offices
inside the same agency, including both the enforcement officials and the IG office
that is charged with receiving complaints about those same enforcement officials

380. 5 U.S.C. app. § 11(d)(1). CIGIE's Special Integrity Committee receives, reviews, and refers for
investigation allegations of wrongdoing.
381. Inspector General Authority to Conduct Regulatory Investigations, 13 Op. O.L.C. 54, 61

(1989).
382. LACK ESSENTIAL TOOLS, supra note 17 at 9.
383. PRINCIPLES AND CONSIDERATIONS, supra note 166 at 7.
384. LACK ESSENTIAL TOOLS, supra note 17 at 12.
385. In its ten-year review of the Inspector General Act of 1978, the House Government Operations
Committee expressed concern that independent blanket law enforcement authority for IGs does not by
itself "provide the due process requirements and protection of individual rights inherent in the grand jury
process, used when the inspectors general conduct investigation in cooperation with the U.S. attorney,
nor ... the oversight inherent in the deputization process." H.R. REP. No. 100-1027 (1988). See also
Frederick M. Kaiser, Full Law Enforcement Authority for Offices of Inspector General: Causes,
Concerns, and Cautions, 15 POLICE STUDIES INT'L REVIEW OF POLICE DEV. 75, 76 (1992).
386. Agencies are accorded "extreme breadth" in conducting regulatory investigations. See Linde

Thomson Langworthy Kohn & Van Dyke, P.C. v. Resolution Trust Corp., 5 F.3d 1508, 1517 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
Courts tend to grant considerable discretion to agencies when investigatory targets complain about compliance

burdens. Appeal of FTC Line of Business Report Litig., 595 F.2d 685, 703 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
958, 99 S.Ct. 362, 58 L.Ed.2d 351 (1978) (reasonableness of request is "presumed" absent showing of undue
burden or disruption). Even the filing of a subsequent criminal or civil action has no effect upon the
enforceability of an administrative subpoena issued by a body with significant investigative powers. See Linde
Thompson, 5 F.3d at 1518 ("Nor does the statute authorizing RTC investigations contemplate the termination
of investigative authority upon the commencement of civil proceedings."); Resolution Trust Corp. v. Frates, 61

F.3d 962, 965 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (filing of civil case did not deprive agency of subpoena power since it could
mean that agency "was still searching for further evidence of the extent of [subpoena recipient's] wrongdoing
or the value of the claims"); Resolution Trust Corp. v. Walde, 18 F.3d 943, 950 (D.C. Cir. 1994)
(rejecting subpoena recipient's argument that the administrative subpoena was moot due to the agency's filing
of a federal civil suit).
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or with evaluating their performance, likewise raises a host of additional
concerns.

D. What IGs Might Say
Inspectors General and their offices are overwhelmingly attempting to perform
an extremely difficult and important job and, in doing so, act as Congress
intended. IGs may understandably respond that the separation of audit and investigative functions and personnel are sufficient to avoid the practical problems,
threats to independence, and the compromise of value to Congress as outlined
above. IGs might also contend that the nature of investigations of wrongdoers
outside their host agencies is sufficiently different from the oversight work that
the IGs perform and that these investigations do not compromise their independence or oversight function. Of course, whether this is true remains in the eye of
the beholder, and the only opinion that matters is that of the IG.
IGs and their staffs are "highly attuned to requests from Congress.'"387 Yet, IGs
can report discomfort with "serving in an agent-like role that advances the political interests of individual legislators." 388 Unfortunately, there is no response to
the point that the entangling consequences of parallel enforcement are inconsistent with the ideal of independence as set forth in the structure of the IG Act.
Threats to the independence of the IG compromise the ability of Congress to rely
on IGs to conduct oversight of the Executive. Even if it is fair to say in most cases
that IGs are better able to support their agencies when they work closer to them
operationally and programmatically, the closer these two are, the harder it is for
Congress to rely on IGs to provide critical information in the manner anticipated
in the statute.

III.

POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS

There are a variety of ways to mitigate the problem identified above. At the
very least, agencies and their IGs should maintain operational independence in
enforcement matters as a matter of policy and practice. For example, if IG personnel report only to their own supervisors, the risks of agency capture and the
dangers inherent in reviewing one's own work could be reduced, if not eliminated. In the alternative, IGs have the potential to develop better guidelines and
principles for determining whether to engage in activities that align them programmatically with the agencies they oversee. This could be done through the
Council of Inspectors General for Integrity and Efficiency ("CIGIE") if they
received rulemaking authority for this purpose.
Another alternative is that Congress could spend more time on initiatives that
promote congressional cooperation with Inspectors General. This action will
result in the strengthening IG independence by scheduling more time for briefings, communicating more, working with IGs to shape mandates, and dedicating

387. How INSPECTORS GENERAL WORK, supra note 1 at 19.

388. Id.
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(or detailing) staff to work between offices. 389 Congress could also invest more
time following-up on IG reports or unimplemented recommendations and maintaining more regular contact with IG offices. 390
Another possibility is that Congress could consider both grandfathering specific reporting and auditing requirements imposed on IGs and also curtailing the
practice of assigning more duties to IGs beyond those in the 1978 IG Act. 391
Hearings could be conducted to review how agencies have delegated responsibilities to their IGs and the extent to which that compromises IG independence.
A more radical solution would be for Congress to amend the IG laws to prohibit investigations of wrongdoers outside an agency, strictly limiting IGs to their
oversight work, and to re-categorize IG investigators doing law enforcement
work as agency personnel. While those changes would initially cause disruption,
they could also return IGs to their original role, strengthen their independence,
and provide more value to Congress.
On the other hand, Congress could simply define the term "program operating
responsibilities." In clarifying and simplifying this meaning, OIGs will have clear
guidance regarding which activities are prohibited by the IG Act and will better
understand that IGs should not ordinarily cooperate in investigations or activities
alongside the agencies they oversee (or other agencies). At the very least,
Congress could require IGs to report on a regular basis their analysis regarding
how the specific activities they undertake in cooperation with their host agencies
do not threaten their independence and the objectivity of their reporting, consistent with the framework outlined in GAGAS and the GAO's recommendations.3

92

CONCLUSION

Inspectors General have unique value as instruments of Congressional oversight. The line prohibiting IGs from engaging in programmatic activities is blurry
and requires judgment calls that are easily made in favor of expanding the scope
of activity. When IGs expand beyond audits and investigations of the agencies
they oversee (whether authorized by law or through individual IG discretion to
interpret their roles more expansively), they are compromising their independence and the value they provide to Congress.
For IGs to accomplish their work effectively and as Congress intended, these
individuals must retain their independence. Parallel enforcement activities undermine IG independence and create a conflict of interest that is inconsistent with
the purposes of the IG Act. When IG independence is undermined, Congressional
oversight is weakened. Safeguarding against this practice to maximize IG independence will benefit Congress in its conduct of oversight activities.

389. TRUTH TELLERS, upranote 20 at 138-39.
390. Id.
391. P'SHIP FOR PUB. SERV., WALKING THE LINE, (2016). Congressional mandates are increasing

and

of increasing concern for IGs. Mandated activities make it difficult for IGs to foresee or respond to
crises. "Mandated reports place a huge burden on... small and midsize OIGs." Id. at 13.
392. PRINCIPLES AND CONSIDERATIONS, supra note 166 at 7.

